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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter under Section 782a-3(j) Utah Code Annotated (1953).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.)
ISSUE ON APPEAL:
DID JUDGE WILKINSON ERR IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, CLAIMS AND
CAUSES OF ACTION WHERE DEFENDANTS COMMITTED
MULTIPLE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF THE
LAWS RESPECTING COMMERCE IN MOTOR VEHICLES.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: The material facts of this case
are not significantly disputed, therefore the Trial Courts' interpretation of those
facts become questions of law. Conclusions of law drawn from the Trial Courts'
interpretations of the facts are reviewed by this Court for correctness and afforded
no deference.

Woodhaven Apt v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918 (Utah 1997);

Diversified Equities v. American Sav. & Loan, 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 1987)
and Reed v. Alvey, 616 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980). Questions of statutory construction
are questions of law reviewed by the Appellate Court under a correction of error
standard. Brown & Root Inds. Service v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 947 P.2d 641
(Utah 1997). When a trial court's rulings are based upon a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have produced a different
result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have the error rectified in a proper
adjudication under correct principle of law. Reed v. Avery, 616 P.2d 1374 (Utah
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1980); Farris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings v. Nielson, 42
Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619(1912).
Preservation ofIssue:

Plaintiffs complaint alleged that: (a) The

defendants violated the Utah Motor Vehicle Act ("Motor Vehicle Act") when they
failed to obtain a salvage title or provide notice of "salvage" as required by law
(i.e., Count I (R. 5-6)). (b) The defendants violated the Utah Consumer Sales
Practices Act, ("Sales Practices Act") when they committed civil and criminal
violations of the Motor Vehicle Act which constitutes evidence of deceptive and
unconscionable acts and practices (i.e., Count II (R. 6-7)). (c) And the defendants'
breaches of their statutory duties constitutes breaches of their fiduciary duties that
were owed to all subsequent purchasers of the subject motor vehicle by their
failures to obtain and provide the salvage certificate or provide the notice of
salvage as required by law (i.e., Count III (R 7)).
STATUTES INTERPRETATIONS WHICH ARE OF DETERMINATIVE
AND OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE ON THE APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks an interpretation and application of the statutes cited
herein to the facts of his case. The statutes that require interpretation are the Sales
Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, and the Utah Uniform Commercial Code
("Commercial Code"). These statutes are reproduced in Addendum A to this brief,
as recognized by Rule 24 Briefs (a) (6) and (11), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure:
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The Sales Practices Act sections requiring interpretation are: Sections 1311-2, 13-11-3 (2) (5) and (6), 13-11-4 (1), (2)(a, b, c, e, j), 13-11-5, 13-11-19 (1),
(2) and (5) and 13-11-23, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
The Motor Vehicle Act sections requiring interpretation are: Sections 41la-1001(6)(a), 41-la-1004(2), 41-la-1005(1 )(a)(i), 41-la-1005(l)(d)(i & ii), 41la-1005(2), 41-la-1008, 41-3-205 (1, 2, & 3), 41-3-210 (l)(c, d), 41-3-404, 41-3701, 41-3-702 (3), (4) & (5), Utah Code Annotated (1953).
The Commercial Code sections requiring interpretation are: Sections 70A1-102, 70A-1-201, 70A-1-106, 70A-2-104, 70A-2-313(l) (a & b), 70A-2-313 (2),
Utah Code Annotated 1953).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case involves Plaintiff/Appellant, James Gordon Holmes, ("plaintiff),
efforts to recover damages from the Defendants/Appellees, American States
Insurance Company ("American"), Economy Auto Inc ("Economy")., and
Clarendon National Insurance Company ("Clarendon") (R 1-10) for their
negligence, deceptive acts, and illegal practices that breached statutory duties that
were owed by them to plaintiff regarding commerce in motor vehicles (R. 465486, 506-517, 536-551). Defendants' breaches polluted the stream of commerce in
motor vehicles by means of their sale of a salvage motor vehicle, the salvage
nature of which was not disclosed (R 465-486, 506-517, 536-551).
3

American declared the vehicle that is the subject of these proceedings
("subject vehicle") a "total loss" salvage, paid over $48,000.00 for a $45,000.00
vehicle (R 98-114, 233-256, 489-499) and then sold it to Economy for only
$12,000.00 (R. 119, 157, 236, 308, 317, 526). Economy had full knowledge that
the subject vehicle was a total loss/salvage motor vehicle when it purchased the
same (R 92, 93, 98-121, 461-462, 446-450, 503-504, 519, 520, 567-568).
Economy is a licensed and bonded motor vehicle dealer doing business as a
use motor vehicle dealer in the State of Utah (R 380, 487-488, 534-535, 552-553).
Clarendon is the bonding company that posted Economy's bond to indemnify those
who suffer loss by reason of Economy's violation of laws respecting commerce in
motor vehicles (R. 487-488, 534-535, 552-553). Plaintiff seeks recovery of the
damages he sustained based upon the defendants' multiple admissions that they
violated both civil and criminal provisions of the laws respecting commerce in
motor vehicles (R. 3-8, 157-166, 200, 203-207, 465-499, 505-516, 554-571, 693727).
American's decision that the subject vehicle was a total loss salvage was
based on its knowledge that the subject vehicle had sustained serious damage from
a rollover accident and would require over $33,855.00 to properly repair the same
(R 496, 530, 561). While the subject vehicle was in its damaged condition, during
the time American held title, plaintiff inquired of American and attempted to
purchase the vehicle (R. 157-158, 221, 229). During plaintiffs conversations with
4

American, American informed plaintiff that the damage to the subject vehicle did
not render it a total loss/salvage (R. 500-512, 506-507, 518-522). American did
not obtain the mandatory salvage certificate of title as required by U.C.A. § 41-1 a1005(l)(a)(i). (R. 461-461, 468, 469, 509, 541, 542, 697).
American sold the subject vehicle to Economy.

Both American and

Economy appear as buyers and sellers on the subject vehicle's title transfer
documents (R. 115, 116, 161, 163, 251, 308, 332, 395-387).

Following

Economy's purchase of the subject vehicle, Economy undertook to conceal the
total loss/salvage nature of the subject vehicle by illegally selling the same to itself
through Western Affiliate Salvage Pool (R 383, 395-397, 473, 512, 545, 569-571,
718). Economy eventually sold the subject vehicle through the Utah Auto Auction
to Hillcrest Service without disclosing the total loss/salvage to either the Utah
Auto Auction or Hillcrest Service. Economy likewise failed to obtain the
mandatory salvage certificate as required by U.C.A. § 41 -1 a-1005(1 )(d)(i & ii). (R.
383, 396-397, 469, 509, 541, 542, 697).
While the subject vehicle was under Economy's ownership and control,
plaintiff contacted Economy and attempted to purchase the subject vehicle from
Economy. During plaintiffs conversations with Economy, Economy indicated
that the subject vehicle was not a salvage motor vehicle (R. 157-158, 409-438,
446-450, 471-472, 519, 717-721). Plaintiffs inspection of the subject vehicle in
its damaged condition disclosed cosmetic body damage that plaintiff believed he
5

could easily repair.(R. 157, 158, 718-719). Plaintiff eventually purchased the
subject vehicle from Hillcrest Service with the understanding that the same was a
damaged, but non-salvage motor vehicle (R. 162, 163, 166, 717-721).
Plaintiff is not a trained, licensed, or certified automobile collision repair
person and only makes cosmetic body and fender repair (R. 705, 717-721). Danny
L. Jenson, a past president of the Utah Automobile Collision Association and
member of Professional Automobile Alliance testified that it was impossible to
determine whether the subject vehicle was a total loss/salvage without first
examining the insurance company's written repair estimate

(R. 703-707).

Alternatively, the subject vehicle would have to be disassembled for inspection of
its crush, collapse and impact absorbing zones to determine to the extent to which
the same had been damaged or needed repair (R. 703-707).
Following plaintiffs purchase he performed cosmetic body and fender
repairs on the subject vehicle and sought coverage of the manufacturer's warranty
for other repairs (R. 472, 500-502, 717-721). It was at this point that plaintiff was
first informed by the vehicle's manufacturer that the subject vehicle was
"scrapped" "warranty void" and that the same was a total loss/salvage. (R. 472,
500-502, 717-721, 722-724, 725-727).

Plaintiff attempted unsuccessfully to

resolve this matter with American but was forced to bring this action for relief.
Plaintiff filed tort claims against American and Economy. (R. 1-10, 478, 510-511)
Plaintiffs

tort

claims

are based on defendants'
6

breach

of statutes,

misrepresentations and omissions in not obtaining or providing the mandatory
salvage certificate of title that Utah law requires under U.C.A. §§ 41-la-1005(l)(a
& d) and 41-1 a-1005(2) (R. 5-6) Count I)).
Plaintiffs tort claims include claims against defendants for their deceptive
and unconscionable acts and practices in not disclosing the total loss/salvage
nature of the subject vehicle and in not otherwise complying with their aforesaid
statutory duties (R. 6-7, 478, 510-511, (Count II)). Plaintiffs claims are based
upon the defendants' breaches of their statutory and fiduciary duties that constitute
prima facie evidence of the defendants' negligence (R 7-8 478, 510-51, (Count
III)). Defendants never rebutted plaintiffs prima facie case of negligence (R 4550, 54-59, 60-65, 478, 510-51, (Count III)).
Clarendon's liability is premised on Economy's liability for Economy
violations of laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles (R. 8, 487-488, 534-535,
552-553 (Count IV)).

Plaintiff believes the defendants' failures to act were

undertaken and carried out with full knowledge that they were violating Utah's
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles so as hide the total loss/salvage and in
order to obtain a higher resale value of the subject vehicle (R. 5-8). For these
reason Equitable estoppel (Count V) was asserted (R 5-8).
The defendants now deny that the subject vehicle was a total loss/Salvage
and that plaintiff knowingly and willingly purchased the subject vehicle in its
damaged condition (R. 157-166, 381-384, 409-438, 441-442, 503-504,567-568).
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The defendants asserted that plaintiff assumed any and all risks concerning the
subject vehicle in that plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle "as is" (R. 741, 762).
Finally, defendants assert that there was no privity of contract between them as
tortfeasors and the plaintiff and that without privity of contract there is no legal
basis for a tort plaintiff to recover against them (R. 159, 508).
Plaintiff appeals from the Honorable Homer Wilkinson's Order of Partial
Summary Judgment, dated June 10, 1999 (R. 645-651, 880-881) and Order Of
Summary Judgment, dated January 22, 1999 (R. 870-872, 880-881.)
Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition
American's Motion For Summary Judgment, dated October 23, 1997 (R.
154-155) was opposed on the grounds that defendants had not yet fully responded
to plaintiffs outstanding discovery.

Plaintiffs Second Motion To Compel

Discovery From American States Insurance Company, Enforcing The Parties
Agreement, For An Award Of Costs And Attorney's Fees, with accompanying
Memorandum were filed on October 27, 1997 (R. 167-168, 169-192) together with
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion and Memorandum For Continuance, (R. 193-195,
196-218). American opposed plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion (R. 269-346). Economy
and Clarendon thereafter filed Motions and Memorandums for Summary
Judgment, Or In The Alternative Motion To Join Indispensable Parties Or In The
Alternative To Amend Defendants Answer To Allege Set Off And/Or Join
Additional Parties Defendants on February 2, 1998 (R. 376-378, 379-438).
8

Plaintiff attempted to obtain the discover}/ that American's counsel had
promised but declined to produce (R 196-218, 219-268, 347-351, 352-360).
Plaintiff also attempted to take the deposition of Economy's principle, Charlie
Fullmer, which deposition the Judge Wilkinson did not allow, notwithstanding Mr.
Fullmer having filed an affidavit herein (R. 374-375, 446-450, 451-453, 454-455,
456-463). Judge Wilkinson also denied plaintiff the opportunity of obtaining
relevant and needed discovery responses to his discovery requests that had been
outstanding for nearly 18, months and denied plaintiff the opportunity to depose
any of the defendants' fact witnesses that were necessary to fully respond to
defendants' various outstanding motions. (R. 464, 572-574)
Defendants' motions were argued to Judge Wilkinson on May 14, 1998 (R.
645.) Judge Wilkinson declined to hear Plaintiffs Notice Of Objections To
Defendants' Proposed Order Of Partial Summary Judgment, dated May 21, 1998
(R. 633-641) and entered the Order Of Partial Summary Judgment on June 10,
1998 (R. 645-651, 654-655). Plaintiffs efforts at obtaining additional discovery
from the defendants were unsuccessful. On September 18, 1998 American filed its
second Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 657-658, 659-690).
Plaintiff was able to obtain independent proof that the subject vehicle was
in fact a total loss/salvage motor vehicle and that the vehicle's manufacture had
denied plaintiffs warranty claims (R. 717-724, 725-272). Based on the newly
discovered evidence, Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum For Reconsideration Of
9

The Court's Order Of Partial Summary Judgment Dated June 10, 1998 was filed
(R. 693-707, 708-727). American moved to strike plaintiffs newly discovered
evidence and opposed plaintiffs motion for reconsideration (R. 737-764, 765-770,
799-840, 841-845). All remaining and outstanding motions were argued to Judge
Wilkinson on December 29, 1998 (R. 870-872).
Judge Wilkinson granted the Motions For Summary Judgment (R. 870-872,
876-877). Plaintiffs' Notice Of Objections To Defendants' Proposed Order Of
Summary Judgment, (R. 868-869) was duly filed with the Court and served herein.
On February 22, 1999 plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal (R. 880-991.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The following facts relevant to the issues presented for review are

established by the record herein.
1.

American is: (a) an insurance company duly licensed and qualified

to do business in the State of Utah as a motor vehicle insurer (R. 156). (b) a
"supplier" under and pursuant to the Sales Practices Act U.C.A. § 13-11-3(6) (R.
466). (c) subject to the Motor Vehicle Act's provisions concerning salvage motor
vehicles. U.C.A. § 41-la-1005(l & 2) (R. 468, 469, 509, 541, 542, 697) and (d) an
owner/seller of the subject vehicle (R. 115, 116, 161, 163, 251, 308, 332, 395387).
2.

Economy is: (a) a licensed and bonded, used motor vehicle dealer

with more than 32 years of experience as such in the State of Utah (R. 448, 461,
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487-488, 534-535, 552-553). (b) a "supplier" under the Sales Practices Act,
U.C.A. § 13-11-3(6) (R. 466-467). (c) a "merchant" under and pursuant to the
Commercial Code, U.C.A. § 70A-2-104(1) (R. 470). (d) an owner and seller of the
subject vehicle (R. 115, 116, 161, 163, 251, 308, 332, 395-387). And (e) subject to
the Motor Vehicle Act's provisions concerning salvage motor vehicles. U.C.A. §
41-la-1005(l & 2) (R. 383, 396-397, 469, 509, 541, 542, 697).
3.

Clarendon was at all material times herein duly qualified to transact

business as a surety in the State of Utah (R. 380, 383, 487-488, 534-535).
Clarendon issued the bond for motor vehicle dealer, which was in full force and
effect at all material times herein. Clarendon's bond was issued to indemnify
persons who suffered loss by reason of Economy's violation of laws respecting
commerce in motor vehicles (R. 3, 8, 380, 440, 466, 487-488, 507-508, 534-535,
538, 553-553).
4.

The defendants, by means of their business activities and conduct act

as (a) "suppliers" under the Sales Practices Act, (R. 457, 470, 539, 542, 543) and
(b) a "merchants" under the Commercial Code (R. 457, 470, 539, 542, 543.)
5.

Plaintiff inquired into, inspected and relied upon defendants'

representations that the subject vehicle was a non-salvage motor vehicle when he
purchased the same (R. 157-158, 409-438, 446-450, 471-472, 500-512, 506-507,
518-522,717-721).
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6.

Notwithstanding the fact that the subject vehicle had been involved

in a serious accident that resulted in it being a salvage motor vehicle, American
undertook no effort to obtain the mandatory salvage title certificate required by
U.C.A. § 41-la-1005(l)(a)(i) (R. 461-461, 468,469, 509, 541, 542, 697).
7.

Plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle in its damaged condition and

caused cosmetic repairs to be made to the same. Following plaintiffs repairs he
attempted to have additional repairs made under the manufacture's warranty, at
which time he was informed that the vehicle had been "scrapped" "warranty void"
and that the subject vehicle did not qualify for manufacturer's warranty protection
(R. 472, 500-502, 503-504, 722-724, 725-727).
8.

Both American and Economy knew that the subject vehicle was a

total loss/salvage and failed to so inform plaintiff, Hillcrest Service, or the Utah
Auto Auction (R. 92, 93, 98-121, 461-462, 446-450, 472, 500-502, 503-504, 519,
520, 567-568, 722-724, 725-727).
9.

Defendants' refused to correct their action concerning their civil and

criminal breaches of the Motor Vehicle Act and the duties owed by each of them to
plaintiff. Defendants' breaches of the laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles
polluted the stream of commerce with their nondisclosure of the subject vehicle's
total loss/salvage. As a result plaintiff filed this lawsuit in an effort to obtain the
remedies provided by law. (R. 1-10).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah has adopted a comprehensive set of laws respecting commerce in
motor vehicles. The purpose of these laws is to insure, among other things, that
the stream of commerce in motor vehicle not be polluted with dangerous, defective
or damaged vehicles that have not been disclosed to the consumer. These laws
attempt to assure that suppliers, dealers and those regularly engaged in the sale of
motor vehicles, such as American and Economy, will act responsibly, honestly and
fairly towards the consuming public. These laws include:
1.

The Motor Vehicle Act.

2.

The Sales Practices Act.

3.

The Uniform Commercial Code, and

4.

The Utah Administrative Code construing the Motor Vehicle Act.

The Motor Vehicle Act imposes upon each dealer, and those such as
American who regularly supply dealers with vehicles, the following requirements
among others: (a) That the dealer be licensed (§ 41-3-201). (b) That the dealer be
bonded, (§ 41-3-205) by a bond in the form of bond approved by the Utah
Attorneys' General ("Dealer's Bond") (§ 41-3-205(l)(c)).

(c) That the dealer

fully, fairly and timely disclose to each purchaser all relevant facts concerning the
physical condition and mileage of each vehicle the dealer sells. (§ 41-3-1310;
Haynes v. Manning, 917 F.2d 450 452- 453 (10 Cir. 1990). (e) That dealers' deal
honestly, fairly and in good faith with their customers (§ 41-3-210). (f) That
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dealers' not commit any fraud, make fraudulent misrepresentation or violate any
laws, rules or regulations respecting commerce in motor vehicles (§ 41-3404(1 )(a)).

(g) And that suppliers (i.e., dealers, insurance companies, and

manufacturers) comply with specific affirmative statutory duties such as disclosure
of salvage (§ 41-la-1005) and buyback of nonconforming vehicles (§ 41-3-407) or
be subject to civil and criminal penalties (§§ 41-la-1005(2), 41-3-701 and 41-3702) (R. 461-462, 468- 469, 509, 541-542, 697).
The motor vehicle Act is strengthened by the following provisions: (a) the
Utah Administrative Code that interprets and underpin parts of the Motor Vehicle
Act's provisions, (b) the express terms of the required dealer bonds, (c) the terms
of the Sales Practices Act and (d) the Commercial Code. The Motor Vehicle Act,
Sales Practices Act and Commercial Code are to be construed broadly to protect
persons, such as the plaintiff, doing business with those who possess superior
knowledge, such as Economy and American, in this case. U.C.A. §§ 13-11-3(6),
41-3-210, 70A-2-104(1) (R. 465-504, 505-535, 536-572). The Dealer Bond's are
to be liberally construed to protect those doing business with licensed dealers such
as Economy. Western Sur. Co. v. Redding, 626 P.2d 437 (Utah 1981).
It is significant that the Motor Vehicle Act imposes civil and criminal
sanctions for its violation (§§ 41-la-1005(2), 31-3-210, 41-3-701, 41-3-702), in
addition to civil liability (§§ 41-3-702(5) and 41-3-404(1)) (R. 468- 470, 509-510,
541-542, 697). Breach of one's statutory duty is conduct, of act or omission,
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which may be treated as negligence without any argument or proof.

Such

violations may be regarded as prima facie evidence of negligence, subject to
justification or excuse, which defendants never rebutted, justified or attempted to
excuse in this case. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1998) (R. 465-504,
505-535, 536-571, 578-596, 602-611).
The Sales Practices Act, covers transactions involving commerce in motor
vehicles, Wilkinson v. B. & H. Auto, 701 F.Supp. 201 (D. Utah 1989), and renders
dealers and suppliers, such as insurance companies, liable for unconscionable or
deceptive acts and practices committed "knowingly or intentionally" (§§ 13-11-4,
13-11-5, 13-11-19) (R. 468, 479, 483, 484, 540). The Sales Practices Act's
provides remedies that are in addition to the remedies otherwise available for the
same conduct under other state laws (§ 13-11-23).
The Commercial Code imposes upon all parties, particularly merchants,
obligations of good faith and fair dealing (§ 70A-1-203) as well as duties of being
honest in fact (§ 70A-1-103). The provisions, purposes and remedies provided
under the Commercial Code are to be liberally administered to the end that the
aggrieved party be put in as good a position as if the other parties had fully
performed (§ 70A-1-106).

The Commercial Code imposes high standards of

conduct on those who possess superior knowledge or skill concerning the product
being sold. (§70A-2-104) (R. 470-471). Consistent with these statutes, Utah's
Supreme Court has held in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) that similar
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duties are imposed upon salespersons and owners of land to know the conditions
of their land. The Dugan Court held that circumstances may "impose upon the
vendor a special duty to know the truth of his representations." 615 P.2d 1245.
The Court explained the reason as being:
The reason, of course, is that the parties to a real estate transaction
do not deal on equal terms. An owner is presumed to know the
boundaries of this own land, the quantity of his acreage, and the
amount of water available. If he does not know the correct
information, he must find out or refrain from making representations
to unsuspecting strangers. Even honesty in making a mistake is no
defense as it is incumbent upon the vendor to know the facts.
615 P.2d at 1246 (Citation, quotation marks, and indentation omitted.) The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals has reached similar results under federal statutes that
impose liability on dealers who falsify odometer information with "intent to
defraud."

The Tenth Circuit has held that dealers have affirmative duties to

discover defects and that an "inference of an intent to defraud is no less
compelling when a person lacks actual knowledge only by closing his eye to the
truth." Haynes v. Manning 917 F.2d 450, 453 (10 Cir. 1990) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted.) 49 U.S.C. § 31710(a).
In Suiter v. Michell Motor Coach Sales Inc., 151 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1998)
a dealer was not allowed to escape liability by simply relying on the assertions of a
previous owner. As stated in Haynes, dealers have affirmative duties to discover
defects. Economy's failure to take any independent steps comply with its statutory
duties constitutes reckless disregard for the purpose of the motor vehicle act. Suiter
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151 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted). To hold otherwise would strip the Utah's
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles of any meaning. Id. Haynes, Suiter
and § 13-11-3(6) clearly do away with any requirement that there be privity of
contract between an injured plaintiff and her tortfeasors. Haynes 917 F.3d at 452;
Suiter 151 F.3d at 1284-85. An injured tort victim/defrauded car buyer under the
Motor Vehicle Act or the Sales Practices Act (and other laws respecting commerce
in motor vehicles) would have no remedy if such victims had to have a contractual
relationship with their tortfeasor before recovery were allowed. Privity of contract
is not and never has been a condition to a tort victim's recovery of damages. (R.
159-160,456-463, 480-481, 515-516, 546-550, 603, 606, 609-610).
The defendants admit to committing multiple civil and criminal violations
of the Motor Vehicle Act. Judge Wilkinson totally ignored the defendants' civil
and criminal misconduct that constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence and
which may be declared and treated as negligence without argument or proof.
Child, 972 P.2d at 432. Defendants' civil and criminal violations of the motor
vehicle act must also establish prima facie evidence of unconscionable acts under
the Sales Practices Act and the duties imposed upon the defendants under the
Commercial Code and Dealer's Bond. Defendants' violations of statutes suffice
for proof of particular facts constituting negligence that the defendants must
contradict by other evidence. Id. Defendants made no such showing.
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ARGUMENT
DID JUDGE WILKINSON ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT, CLAIMS AND CAUSES OF ACTION WHERE
DEFENDANTS COMMITTED MULTIPLE CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS RESPECTING
COMMERCE IN MOTOR VEHICLES.
POINT I
THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT CONCERNING
DEFENDANTS' BREACHES OF STATUTES
Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of material fact
exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Amax v. Tax,
881 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); citing Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Utah 1990).
Because summary judgment does not resolve factual issues, a challenge to
summary judgment presents for review only questions of law. This Court should
review Judge Wilkinson's findings and conclusions for correctness, according
Judge Wilkinson no particular deference. Amax, 881 P.2d 943 citing Transamerica
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990);
accord Mt. Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah
1988). In determining whether Judge Wilkinson correctly concluded there was no
genuine issue of material fact, this Court should review the facts and inferences to
be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing or nonmoving party.
Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Ut. App. 1994); Amax, 881 P.2d 943 citing Hamblin
v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1990)
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Defendants9 Violations Of The Motor Vehicle Act Established
Plaintiffs Prima Facie Case Of Negligence

A.

Plaintiff briefed, argued, re-briefed and reargued his claims to Judge
Wilkinson that the defendants' breaches of the following statutes constitute
negligence per se or prima facie evidence of defendants' negligence which
defendants' did not rebut:
1.

U.C.A. § 41-la-1001(6)(a) defines:

"Salvage vehicle" means any vehicle:
(i)
damaged by collision, flood, or other occurrence to the extent
that the costs of repairing the vehicle for safe operation exceeds its fair
market value; or
(ii)
that has been declared a salvage vehicle by an insurer or other
state or jurisdiction, but is not precluded from further registration and
titling. (Emphasis added.)
2.

U.C.A. § 41-la-1004(2) requires:

"Before the sale of a vehicle for which a salvage certificate or branded
title has been issued, the seller shall provide the prospective purchaser
with written notification that a salvage certificate or branded title has
been issued for the vehicle.
3.

U.C.A. § 41-la-1005(l)(a)(i) requires:

"If an insurance company declares a vehicle a salvage vehicle and
takes possession of the vehicle for disposal, or an insurance company
pay off the owner of a vehicle that is stolen and not recovered, the
insurance company shall within ten days from the settlement of the
loss surrender to the division the outstanding certificate of title,
properly endorsed, or other evidence of ownership acceptable to the
division." (Emphasis added.)
4.

U.C.A. § 41-la-1005(l)(d)(i & ii) requires:

"(i)
If a dealer licensed under Title 41, Chapter 3, Part 2,
Licensing, takes possession of any salvage vehicle for which there is
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not already issued branded title or salvage certificate from the
division or another jurisdiction, the dealer shall within ten days
surrender to the division the certificate of title or other evidence of
ownership acceptable to the division.
(ii)
The division shall then issue a salvage certificate in the
applicant's name. (Emphasis added.)
5.

U.C.A. § 41-la-1005(2) criminalizes the conduct plaintiff complains

of herein against the defendants:
"Any person, insurance company, or dealer licensed under Title 41,
Chapter 3, Part 2 Licensing, who fails to obtain a salvage certificate of
title as required in this section or who sells a salvage vehicle without
first obtaining a salvage certificate is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
6.

U.C.A. § 41-3-702(1-5) imposes civil penalties for violations of the

salvage notice provisions in addition to the criminal penalties outlined above.
Specifically:
"(3)
The following are civil violations in addition to criminal
violations under section 41-la-1008:
(b)
fraudulently certifying that a damaged motor vehicle is entitled
to an unbranded title, as defined under Section 41-la-1001 when it is
not.
(4)
The civil penalty for violation under Subsection (1) is:
(a)
not less than $1,000, or treble the actual damages caused by
the person, whichever is greater; and
(b)
reasonable attorney 'sfees and costs of the action.
(5)
A civil action may be maintained by a purchaser or by the
administrator, (emphasis added.)
7.

Utah Administrative Code R873-22M-25 states:

A.
The Motor Vehicle Division shall brand a vehicle's title if, at
the time of initial registration or transfer or ownership, evidence exists
that the vehicle is a salvage vehicle.
B.
Written notification that a vehicle has been issued a salvage
certificate or branded title shall be made to a prospective purchaser
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on a form approved by the Administrator of the Motor Vehicle
Enforcement Division.
C.
The form must clearly and conspicuously disclose that the
vehicle has been issued a salvage certificate or branded title.
D.
The form must be presented to and signed by the prospective
purchaser and the prospective lien holder\ if any, prior to the sale of
the vehicle.
E.
If the seller of the vehicle is a dealer, the form must be
prominently displayed in the lower passenger-side corner of the
windshield for the period of time the vehicle is on display for sale.
F.
The original disclosure form shall be given to the purchaser
and a copy shall be given to the new lienholder, if any. A copy shall
be kept on file by the seller for a period of three years from the date of
sale if the seller is a dealer. (Emphasis added.)
(R. 465-504, 505-535, 536-572, 602-611, 633-642, 693-707, 708-727, 868-869).
B.

Plaintiffs Prima Facie Case Of Negligence Establishes Prima Facie
Case Of Violations Of Sales Practices Act
Plaintiff also briefed, argued, re-briefed and reargued to Judge Wilkinson

that violations of the aforementioned statutes are per se or prima facie evidence of
unconscionable acts and practices that violated the following sections of the Sales
Practices Act:
1.

"Consumer Transaction" as found at § 13-11-3(2) states:

"Consumer Transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award by
chance, or other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods,
services, or other property, both tangible and intangible "(except
securities and insurance), to a person for primarily personal, family, or
household purposes, or for purposes that relate to a business
opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money or property
and his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he has not
been previously engaged, or a solicitation or offer by a supplier with
respect to any of these transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or
solicitation, any agreement, any performance of any agreement with
respect to any of these transfers or dispositions, and any charitable
solicitation as defined in this section/' (Emphasis added.)
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2.

U.C.A. § 13-11-3(6) classifies the defendants as suppliers:

"Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or other
person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer
transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the consumer.
3.

Defendants' failures to comply with the requirements of § 41-la-

1005 is prima facie evidence of conduct and acts that are negligent, deceptive and
unconscionable under § 13-11-4(1) and (2)(a, b, c, e & j). Defendants did not
factually contest application of these sections to them other than to assert that they
were not suppliers, in that they did not sell the subject vehicle to plaintiff:
"(1)
A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a
consumer transaction violates this chapter whether it occurs before,
during, or after the transaction.
(2)
Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier
commits a deceptive act or practice if the supplier knowingly or
intentionally:
(a)
indicates that the subject transaction has sponsorship,
approval, performance characteristics, accessories, use or benefits, if
has not;
(b)
indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a
particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not;
(c)
indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or
unused, if it is not, or has been used to an extent that is materially
different from the fact,
(e)
indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been
supplied in accordance with previous representations, if it has not; and
(j)
indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not
involve a warranty, disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms,
or other rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation is false.
4.

Plaintiff also argued to Judge Wilkinson that U.C.A. § 13-11-5(3)

requires the Court to ". . .consider circumstances which the supplier knew or had
reason to know" in determining whether the defendants acts or practices
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complained of were "unconscionable."

The facts in this case establish that

defendants knew that the subject vehicle was a "total loss salvage motor vehicle"
and that they sold the same without any attempt to comply with the Motor Vehicle
Act's affirmative duties and requirements concerning notice of salvage. (R. 156166, 169-192, 196-218, 219-268, 347-351, 379-438, 439-445, 446-450, 465-504,
505-535, 536-572, 602-611, 615-617, 633-642, 659-690, 693-707, 708-727, 737762, 765-770, 771-782, 785-792, 793-795, 868-869).
C.

Plaintiffs Prima Facie Showing Of Negligence Established Commercial
Code Violations
The Commercial Code's provisions and multiple references to "good faith,"

(§§ 70A-1-102(3), 70A-1-201(19), 70A-1-203, 70A-2-103(l)(b)) demonstrate an
unwavering duty that "honesty in fact" in ones conduct and observance of
reasonable and fair dealings be maintained. One's obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care may not be disclaimed or avoided. Utah has
long recognized that a seller, whether he or she is a "merchant" (§ 70A-2-104), a
"supplier" (§ 13-11-3(6)), or a "dealer" (§ 41-la-102(13) & 41-3-102(8)), is
presumed to know the material facts concerning that which it is that he or she sells.
Howe v. Michelson, 225 P.2d 735 (Utah 1951). The Commercial Code allows no
more than a slight or unimportant variation from what is specified or described by
the seller and what is actually delivered. Norrington v. Wright, 115 U.S. 188
(1885).
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Legislative and judicial abandonment of the doctrine of caveat emptor is
consistent with the changes in the Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act and
other provisions of the Commercial Code.

U.C.A. § 70A-313(a) and (b)

specifically does away with "buyer beware" by making affirmations of fact and
descriptions that become a part of the basis of the bargain express warranties that
the goods will conform with the affirmations or promises. The doctrine of caveat
emptor is also incompatible with prevailing trends in consumer law, product's
liability law, and the law of torts. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991);
WoodhavenApts v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 924 (Utah 1997).
Of particular concern to plaintiff and his claims are the defendants'
admissions that they violated multiple provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act. The
plaintiff contends that the Motor Vehicle Act recognizes and provides him with a
remedy for defendants' breaches of the same which are also breaches of warranty.
The defendants breached their duties of good faith, honesty in fact,
diligence, reasonableness, care, due diligence, duty to supply goods that conformed
to their representations, and engaged in deceptive and unconscionable conduct in
selling the subject vehicle and placing it back into the stream of commerce. The
Commercial Code exacts higher standards from those "who deal in goods of the
kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction" (§ 70A-2-104(1)).
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§ 70A-2-313(l) and (2) outline the express warranties that defendants
created when they allowed the subject vehicle back into the sream of commerce
without disclosing the total loss/salvage.

§ 70A-2-313(l) recognize that "any

affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods and becomes a part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform." Subsection (2) recognizes that it "is not necessary
to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as
'warrant' or 'guarantee' or that he have a specific intent to make a warranty...."
A positive affirmation of fact that tends to induce a bargain is a warranty
and the fact that the seller did not intend to warrant is no defense.

Park v.

Moorman Mtg. Co., 241 P.2d 914, 917 (Utah 1952); Studebaker v. Bros. Co. v.
Anderson 167 Pac. 663 (Utah 1917). Oral representations of fact are recognized in
other jurisdictions as warranties as well and not as "mere puffing." See Chrysler Plymouth City Inc. v. Guerrero, 620 SW 2d 700 (Tex Civ. App. 4th Dist. 1981). In
Hackett v. Lewis, 173 Pac. I l l (Cal. App. 1918), the court held to the simple
principle that any distinct assertion made by the seller and intended to be relied
upon to induce a purchase is a warranty.
Even a representation made after a sale, to promote the sale by inviting
reliance respecting the thing sold may be actionable as express warranties. Downie
v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 1235 (10th Cir. 1984). Defendants' refusal to inform
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plaintiffs of the true status of the subject vehicle's total loss/salvage breached the
express warranties that induced plaintiffs purchase of the subject vehicle.
Whether an affirmation of fact, a promise, or a description of the goods is a
warranty is determined by what a reasonable person would have taken from the
statement. State of Utah, By Div. of Consumer Protection v. GAFF Corp.. 760
P.2d 310 (Utah 1988). An express warranty is created when a reasonable person
would have entered into the transaction based on the particular statement. Id, 3 R.
Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313:50 at 40 (3d Id.
1983). Actual reliance need not be shown, as in this case, only that the statement
formed a "part of the bargain."

§ 70A-2-313, Jensen v. Seigel Mobil Homes

Group, 668 P.2d 65, 71 (Idaho 1983), Autzen v. John C Taylor Lumber Sales, 572
P.2d 1322, 1324-25 (Oregon 1977).
The undisputed facts are that defendants did not disclose the salvage. The
nondisclosure has civil and criminal repercussions and plaintiff is entitled to
recover the damages provided by law for plaintiff would not have purchased a
salvage motor vehicle had he known of the salvage. (R. 720).
D.

Interpretation And Application Of Statutes To The Facts Of This Case
In Child 972 P.2d at 432, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the difference

between "per se" negligence and "prima facie" evidence of negligence. Negligence
per se usually results from a violation of a statute and is defined as:
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"[c]onduct, whether of act or omission, which may be declared and
treated as negligence without any argument or proof as to the particular
circumstances . . ."Black's Law Dictionary 1035 (6th Ed. 1990)
By comparison, prima facie evidence of negligence is recognized and defined as:
"[t]hat quantum of evidence that suffices for proof of a particular fact
until the fact is contradicted by other evidence; once the trier of fact
faced with conflicting evidence, it must weigh the prima facie evidence
with all of the other probative evidence presented.
Gaw v. State, 798 at 1135 (Utah 1990). In this case, plaintiff presented evidence
of defendants' civil and criminal violations of the Motor Vehicle Act and other
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles. Plaintiff prima facie showing of
defendants' negligence precluded Judge Wilkinson from granting defendants'
motions for summary judgment as a matter of law. Child, 972 P.2d at 432.
The prima facie evidence of negligence was evidence that was sufficient to
submit the question of defendants' negligence to the jury, and would have
supported a verdict of negligence. Id, at 432.

Judge Wilkinson's granting

defendants' summary judgment was highly improper, contrary to the Child
standard, and ignores the mandate that Judge Wilkinson make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Where evidence was
presented that statutes were violated, it was strictly within the providence of the
jury to weigh the evidence and determine whether or not to believe the defendants
proffered explanation for violating the law or find in favor for plaintiff. Id. at 432.
Amax 881 P.2d 943 (Tutah 1993); citing Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d at
25; accord Mt. Fuel Supply Co., 752 P.2d at 887 (Utah 1988).
27

Where Judge Wilkinson's rulings were based upon a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have produced a different
result, plaintiff is entitled to have the error rectified in a proper adjudication under
correct principles of law. Reed v. Avery, 616 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Farris v.
Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979); Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac.
619(1912).
Defendants did not present any contrary evidence to plaintiffs prima facie
case. Instead defendants claimed that the subject vehicle was not salvage, that
there was no privity of contract, that they were not sellers/suppliers and that the
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles did not apply to them (R. 156-160,
379-397, 447-449).
Plaintiffs expert Danny L. Jenson testified that an untrained, uncertified
and inexperienced persons, such as plaintiff, are not capable or qualified to know
when a motor vehicle has been declared a total loss/salvage based on a visual
inspection.

(R. 705).

Mr. Jenson also testified that today's vehicles require

extensive knowledge, training and experience before their crash, crush and impact
absorbing areas can be properly evaluated and repaired (R. 705).
It was the expert's opinion that the only way to determine whether the
subject vehicle was a total loss/salvage was to review American's documents prior
to purchase or have the vehicle disassembled

(R. 705-706). And it was the

expert's opinion that the subject vehicle was a salvage motor vehicle requiring a
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branded title that the defendants knew was required but never applied for or
obtained (R. 706).
The Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, the Commercial Code, and
Economy's bond should be construed for the purpose of keeping Utah law
consistent with federal and sister states' consumer protection standards. In the
absence of any language to the contrary, these Acts should be construed in a
manner consistent with that given similar federal and sister states laws. U.C.A. §§
13-11-2, 70A-1-102(2).
The statutes cited herein and the dealer's bonds are to be liberally and
broadly construed. U.C.A. §§ 13-11-2, 70A-1-106, Western Sur. Co. v. Redding,
626 P.2d 437 (Utah 1981) (This section should be construed broadly to protect
persons doing business with motor vehicle dealers.) The intent and purpose of
these laws is to protect consumers and require suppliers to abandon use of
deceptive and unconscionable practices. Economy's dealer bond provides that it
will indemnify those who might suffer loss by reason of Economy's violation of
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles. The dealer bond states:
"...if the above bounded principal . . . shall well and truly observe and
comply with all requirements and provisions of THE ACT PROVIDING
FOR THE REGULATION AND CONTROL OF THE BUSINESS OF
DEALING IN MOTOR VEHICLES, as provided by Chapter 3, Title 41,
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), and indemnify persons, firms and
corporations in accordance with Chapter 3, Title 41, Utah Code Ann. (1953,
as amended), for loss suffered by reason of the fraud or fraudulent
representations made or through the violation of any of the provisions of
Chapter 3, Title 41, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), or any law
respecting commerce in motor vehicles or rule respecting commerce in
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motor vehicles promulgated by a licensing or regulating authority so that
the total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons making claims
may not exceed $20,000.00
, as set forth in Chapter 3, Title 41, Utah
Code Ann. (1953, as amended) on account of fraud or fraudulent
representations or for any violation or violations of said laws or rules
during the time of said license and all renewals thereof then the above
obligation shall be null and void, otherwise to remain in full force and
effect. Said bonded Principal shall also pay reasonable attorney's fees in
cases successfully prosecuted or settled against the Surety or Principle if the
bond has not been depleted"
(Emphasis added)(R. 487-488, 534-535, 552-553) (Addendum B.)
Contrary to Judge Wilkinson's two rulings that interpreted the acts in
question, plaintiff is entitled to a remedy, for the acts themselves must be
construed as providing an individual right of action. When one suffers a loss,
particularly a consumer, due to a fraud, fraudulent representations or violation of
any law, rule or regulation respecting commerce in motor in motor vehicles, the
consumer must be protected and allowed a remedy against the tortfeasor or
dealer's surety. Betenson v. Call Auto Equip. Sales Inc., 645 P.2d 684 (Utah
1982).
The legislature has given consumers additional protections by granting to
those consumers who must pursue a remedy in court the right to recover the
consumer's costs and attorneys fees as a matter of law (§§ 13-11-19(5), 41-3205(3) and 41-3-702 (4)(b)). The Dealer's Bond at issue in these proceedings
expressly provides that the "Principal shall also pay reasonable attorneys' fees in
cases successfully prosecuted or settled against the Surety or Principal if the bond
has not been depleted." (R.. 487-488, 534-535, 552-553.)
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The statutes providing for minimal damages (§§ 13-11-19(2), 41-3-702(4)),
actual damages (§ 13-11-19(2)), or treble damages (§ 41-3-702(4)) in addition to
costs and attorneys fees thus making the litigation of consumer protection claims a
matter of public interest. Judge Wilkinson erred in dismissing plaintiffs claims
under the Commercial Code for the defendants' breaches of express/implied
warranty. Whether or not plaintiff acted as a reasonable person when he relied
upon the defendants' representations was a question for the jury to decide not
Judge Wilkinson.
It is simply bad law to hold that once a buyer buys, it is assumed that he
knew what he was buying. Baker v. Latser, 206 Pac. 553 (Utah 1922); Official
Comment No. 9 to §70A-2-315. Utah has long recognized that a party may
justifiably rely on positive representations of fact without an independent
investigation. Id.

Conder v. Williams 739 P.2d 634, 638 (Utah App. 1987).

Today's motor vehicles are too sophisticated and complex and are too difficult and
expensive to maintain and in many instances require particular expertise, special
education and specialized tools to properly inspect, diagnose, maintain, or repair
them. (R. 703-707). It is contrary to the authority cited to hold that a buyer is
presumed to be on equal footing with the merchant/supplier when he buys.
Judge Wilkinson ignored the Commercial Code's non-waivable inescapable
duties. The defendants, who had more knowledge than anyone concerning the
subject vehicle, were rewarded by Judge Wilkinson for their nondisclosure. As
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merchants/suppliers they did not have the right or privilege to use their superior
knowledge and skill to hide the material facts concerning the total loss/salvage
condition the subject vehicle was in when they sold it. Such conduct is prima facie
evidence of unconscionablity and under Child a question that the jury should have
decided. As such, Judge Wilkinson's summary judgment was improper.
E.
Judge Wilkinson Erred When He Denied Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion,
Prevented Plaintiff From Deposing Defendants' Fact Witnesses, Failed To
Compel Defendants' To Answer Plaintiffs Discovery Requests And Granted
Defendants' Motions Based On The Court's Own Factual Findings
Plaintiff was denied the right to be provided by the defendants with
appropriate and meaningful responses to plaintiffs discovery requests. Plaintiff
was denied the right to depose defendants' fact witnesses and he was denied the
right to obtain responses directed toward the discovery of facts that were highly
relevant to the issues raised by the pleadings. In addition, plaintiff was precluded
from having material fact issues decided by the jury as the fact finder. Instead,
Judge Wilkinson improperly acted as the fact finder in granting defendants'
motions. (R. 633-642, 868-869) Because summary judgment by definition does
not resolve factual issues, it was plain error for Judge Wilkinson to find that
plaintiff knew he was buying salvage, that he was not misled, that he was not
misrepresented to by the defendants, and that he had buyer's remorse. (Addendum
B. page 33). (R. 633-641, 868-869.)
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CONCLUSION
Judge Wilkinson, notwithstanding the defendants' admitted multiple
violations of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, the Sales Practices Act and
the Commercial Code, granted the defendants' summary judgment motions with
respect to all of plaintiffs claims based upon such violations. The defendants
violated these provisions knowingly and intentionally thereby enabling them to
hide and conceal the total loss/salvage nature of the subject vehicle.

The

defendants polluted the stream of commerce in motor vehicles by their nondisclosure of the total loss/salvage nature of the subject vehicle that plaintiffs
ultimately purchased at a significantly inflated price and in a seriously unsafe
condition. The safeguards intended by the legislature to preclude the kind of
conduct in which the defendants' engaged in their dealings has been subverted and
rendered wholly ineffective.
This Court should rule:

(A) That the defendants had a positive non-

abandonable legal duty to disclose the total loss/salvage condition of the subject
vehicle at the time it was sold, and to honestly, fully, fairly and timely advise
plaintiff of all relevant facts concerning such condition.

(B) That plaintiff is

entitled to pursue each and all of the rights and remedies which are expressly
afforded him by the Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, the Commercial
Code, the Utah Administrative Code, and the Dealer's Bond based on his prima
facie showing of negligence. (C) That Judge Wilkinson's finding of facts and

">
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award of costs was in error. And (D) that the aforementioned Acts are to be
construed liberally and broadly in plaintiffs favor to insure that the rights and
remedies of plaintiff as a member of the consuming public are safe guarded and
rendered effective and meaningful.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this , f (lay of September, 1999.
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Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's
Brief was served upon the following individual by mailing a copy thereof, postage
prepaid, to said individual at the following address this cr^ day of September,
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Paul M. Belnap
STRONG & HANNI
Attorney for American
6TH Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
A. W. Lauritzen
Attorney for Economy & Clarendon
610 North Main
Logan, UT 84321
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ADDENDUM A
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE AND OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL:
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act:
13-11-2,

Construction and purposes of act.

This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer
sales practices;
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and
unconscionable sales practices;
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices;
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not
inconsistent with the policies of the Federal Trade Commission Act relating
to consumer protection;
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administrative rules, with
respect to the subject of this act among those states which enact similar
laws; and
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good faith comply
with the provisions of this act.
13-11-3.

Definitions.

(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award
by chance, or other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, services, or
other property, both tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance), to
a person for primarily personal, family, or household purposes, or for purposes
that relate to a business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money
or property and his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he has
not been previously engaged, or a solicitation or offer by a supplier with respect
to any of these transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or solicitation, any
agreement, any performance of an agreement with respect to any of these
transfers or dispositions, and any charitable solicitation as defined in this section.
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government,
governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership,
association, cooperative, or any other legal entity.
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or
other person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions,
whether or not he deals directly with the consumer.
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13-11-4.

Deceptive act or practice by supplier.

(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer
transaction violates this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a
deceptive act or practice if the supplier knowingly or intentionally:
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship,
approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it
has not;
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular
standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not;
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused,
if it is not, or has been used to an extent that is materially different from the
fact;
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied
in accordance with a previous representation, if it has not;
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a
warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other
rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation is false;
13-11-5.

Unconscionable act or practice by supplier.

(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier in connection with a
consumer transaction violates this act whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a question of law for the
court. If it is claimed or appears to the court that an act or practice may be
unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making its
determination.
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the court
shall consider circumstances which the supplier knew or had reason to know.
13-11-19.

Actions by consumer.

(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise has an
adequate remedy at law, a consumer may bring an action to:
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this
chapter; and
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who has
violated, is violating, or is likely to violate this chapter.
2

(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter
may recover, but not in a class action, actual damage or $2,000, whichever is
greater, plus court costs.
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may
award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work
reasonably performed if:
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this
chapter has brought or maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or a
supplier has committed an act or practice that violates this chapter; and
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or
required by the court to be settled under Subsection 13-11-21 (l)(a).
13-11-23act.

Other remedies available—Class action only as prescribed by

The remedies of this act are in addition to remedies otherwise available for
the same conduct under state or local law, except that a class action relating to a
transaction governed by this act may be brought only as prescribed by this act.
Utah Motor Vehicle Dealer Act:
41-la-1001.

Definitions

(6) "Salvage vehicle" means any vehicle:
(a) damaged by collision, flood, or other occurrence to the extent
that the cost of repairing the vehicle for safe operation exceeds its fair
market value; or
41-la-1004.

Certificate of title - Salvage vehicles

(2) Before the sale of a vehicle for which a salvage certificate or branded
title has been issued, the seller shall provide the prospective purchaser with written
notification that a salvage certificate or a branded title has been issued for the
vehicle.
41-la-1005. Salvage vehicle - Declaration by insurance company Surrender of title - Salvage certificate of title.
(1) (a) (i) If an insurance company declares a vehicle a salvage vehicle
and takes possession of the vehicle for disposal, or an insurance
company pays off the owner of a vehicle that is stolen and not
recovered, the insurance company shall within tern days from the
settlement of the loss surrender to the division the outstanding

certificate of title, properly endorsed, or other evidence of
ownership acceptable to the division,
(d) (i) If a dealer licensed under Title 41, Chapter 3, Part 2, Licensing,
takes possession of any salvage vehicle for which there is not
already issued a branded title or salvage certificate from the
division or another jurisdiction, the dealer shall within ten days
surrender to the division the certificate of title or other evidence of
ownership acceptable to the division,
(ii) The division shall then issue a salvage certificate in the
applicant's name.
(2) Any person, insurance company, or dealer licensed under Title 41,
Chapter 3, Part 2, Licensing, who fails to obtain a salvage certificate as required in
this section or who sells a salvage vehicle without first obtaining a salvage
certificate is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
41-la-1008.

Criminal penalty for violation.

It is a class A misdemeanor to knowingly violate Sections 41-la-1001
through 41-la-1007, unless another penalty is specifically provided.
41-3-205,

Licenses—Bonds required—Maximum liability—Action against
surety—
(1) (a) Before a dealer's, special equipment dealer's, crusher's, or body
shop's license is issued the applicant shall file with the administrator a
corporate surety bond in the amount of:
(i) $20,000 for a motor vehicle dealer's license or special
equipment dealer's license;
(ii) $1,000 for a motorcycle or small trailer dealer's or crusher's
license; or
(iii) $10,000 for a body shop's license.
(b) The corporate surety shall be licensed to do business within the
state.
(c) The form of the bond:
(i) shall be approved by the attorney general;
(ii) shall be conditioned upon the applicant's conducting business
as a dealer without fraud or fraudulent representation and without
violating this chapter; and
(iii) may be continuous in form.
(d) The total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons
making claims may not exceed the amount of the bond.
(2) A cause of action under Subsection (1) may not be maintained
against a surety unless:

(a) a claim is filed in writing with the administrator within one year
after the cause of action arose; and
(b) the action is commenced within two years after the claim was
filed with the administrator.
(3) A person making a claim on the bond shall be awarded attorneys' fees
in cases successfully prosecuted or settled against the surety or principal if the
bond has not been depleted.
41-3-210. License holders—Prohibitions.
(1) The holder of any license issued under this chapter may not:
(c) violate this chapter or the rules made by the administrator;
(d) violate any law of the state respecting commerce in motor
vehicles of any rule respecting commerce in motor vehicles made by
any licensing or regulating authority of the state.
41-3-404. Right of action against dealer, salesperson, crusher, body shop, or
surety on bond.
(1) A person may maintain an action against a dealer, crusher, or body ship
on the corporate surety bond if:
(a) the person suffers a loss or damage because of:
(i) fraud;
(ii) fraudulent representation; or
(iii) a violation of:
(A) this chapter;
(B) any law respecting commerce in motor vehicles; or
(C) a rule respecting commerce in motor vehicle made by a
licensing
or regulating authority; and
(b) the loss or damage results from the action of:
(i) a licensed dealer;
(ii) a licensed dealer's salesperson action on behalf of the dealer or
within the scope of the salesperson's employment;
(iii) a licensed crusher; or
(iv) a body shop.
(2) Successive recovery against a surety on a bond is permitted, but the
total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons making claims may not
exceed the amount of the bond.
(3) A cause of action may not be maintained against any surety under any
bond required under this chapter except as provided in Section 41-3-205.
41-3-701. Violations as misdemeanors.
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(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter any person who violates
this chapter or any rule made by the administrator is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(2) A person who violates Section 41-3-201 is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) A person who violates Section 41-3-301 is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor unless the selling dealer complies with the requirements of Section
41-3-403.
41-3-702. Civil penalty for violation.
(3) The following are civil violations in addition to criminal violations
under Section 41-la-1008:
(a) knowingly selling a salvage vehicle, as defined in Section 41-la1001, without disclosing that the salvage vehicle has been repaired or
rebuilt;
(b) knowingly making a false statement on a vehicle damage disclosure
statement, as defiled in Section 41-la-1001; or
(c) fraudulently certifying that a damaged motor vehicle is entitled to
an unbranded title, as defined in Section 41-la-l001, when it is not.
(4) The civil penalty for a violation under Subsection (1) is:
(a) not less than $1,000, or treble the actual damages caused by the
person, whichever is greater; and
(b) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action.
(5) A civil action may be maintained by a purchaser or by the
administrator.
Utah Administrative Code R873-22M-25 states:
A.
The Motor Vehicle Division shall brand a vehicle's title if, at
the time of initial registration or transfer or ownership, evidence exists
that the vehicle is a salvage vehicle.
B.
Written notification that a vehicle has been issued a salvage
certificate or branded title shall be made to a prospective purchaser on
a form approved by the Administrator of the Motor Vehicle
Enforcement Division.
C.
The form must clearly and conspicuously disclose that the
vehicle has been issued a salvage certificate or branded title.
D.
The form must be presented to and signed by the prospective
purchaser and the prospective lien holder, if any, prior to the sale of
the vehicle.
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E.
If the seller of the vehicle is a dealer, the form must be
prominently displayed in the lower passenger-side corner of the
windshield for the period of time the vehicle is on display for sale.
F.
The original disclosure form shall be given to the purchaser
and a copy shall be given to the new lienholder, if any. A copy shall
be kept on file by the seller for a period of three years from the date of
sale if the seller is a dealer..)
Utah Uniform Commercial Code:
70A-1-102. Purposes—Rules of construction—Variation by agreement.
(1) This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
(3) The effect of provisions of this act may be varied by agreement, except
as otherwise provided in this act and except that the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this act may not be disclaimed by
agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the
performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
(4) The presence in certain provisions of this act of the words "unless
otherwise agreed" or words of similar import does not imply that the effect of
other provisions may not be varied by agreement under Subsection (3).
(5) In this act unless the context otherwise requires
(a) words in the singular number include the plural, and in the plural
include the singular;
(b) words of the masculine gender include the feminine and the
neuter, and when the sense so indicates words of the neuter gender may
refer to any gender.
70A-1-103.

Supplementary general principles of law applicable.

Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to
contract, principal and agent, estoppel fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions.
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70A-1-106. Remedies to be liberally administered.
(1) The remedies provided by this act shall be liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party
had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may
be had except as specifically provided in this act or by other rule of law.
(2) Any right or obligation declared by this act is enforceable by action
unless the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect.
70A-1-201. General definitions.
(3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances including course
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in
Sections 70A-1-205 and 70A-2-208. Whether an agreement has legal
consequences is determined by the provisions of this title, if applicable;
otherwise by the law of contracts as provided in Section 70A-1-103.
Compare the definition of "contract" in Subsection (11).
(11) "Contract" means the total legal obligation which results from
the parties' agreement as affected by this title and any other applicable rules
of law. Compare the definition of "agreement" in Subsection (3).
(15) "Document of title" includes bill of lading, dock warrant, dock
receipt, warehouse receipt, or order for the delivery of goods, and also any
other document which in the regular course of business or financing is
treated as adequately representing that the person in possession of it is
entitled to receive, hold and dispose of the document and the goods it
covers. To be a document of title, a document must purport to be issued by
or addressed to a bailee and purport to cover goods in the bailee's
possession which are either identified or are fungible portions of an
identified mass.
(19) "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned.
70A-1-203.

Obligation of good faith.

Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement.
70A-2-103.

Definitions and index of definitions.

(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires
(a) "Buyer" means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods.

(b) "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade.
(d) "Seller" means a person who sells or contracts to sell goods.
70A-2-104. Definitions—"Merchant"- " Between merchants"- "Financing
agency."
(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or
other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill.
(2) "Financing agency" means a bank, finance company or other person
who in the ordinary course of business makes advances against goods or
documents of title or who by arrangement with either the seller or the buyer
intervenes in ordinary course to make or collect payment due or claimed under the
contract for sale, as by purchasing or paying the seller's draft or making advances
against it or by merely taking it for collection whether or not documents of title
accompany the draft. Financing agency" includes also a bank or other person who
similarly intervenes between persons who are in the position of seller and buyer in
respect to the goods (Section 701-2-707).
(3) "Between merchants" means in any transaction with respect to which
both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants.
70A-2-105.

Definitions—"Goods"

(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods)
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than
the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 8) and
things in action.
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them
can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identified are "future" goods. A
purported present sale of future goods or of any interest therein operates as a
contract to sell.
(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing identified goods.
70A-2-106. Definitions—"Contract"—"Agreement"—"Contract for sale"—
"Sale"—"Present sale"—"Conforming" to contract—
"Termination"- "Cancellation."
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires "contract" and
"agreement" are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods.
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"Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell
goods at a future time. A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price (Section 70A-2-401). A "present sale" means a sale which is
accomplished by the making of the contract.
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are
"conforming" or conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the
obligations under the contract.
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by
agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On
"termination" all obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged
but any right based on prior breach or performance survives.
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for
breach by the other and its effect is the same as that of "termination" except that
the canceling party also retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any
unperformed balance.
70A-2-302. Unconscionable contract or clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to
aid the court in making the determination.
70A-2-312.

Warranty of title and against infringement - Buyer's obligation
against infringement.

(2) A warranty under Subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only by
specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that
the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell
only such right or title as he or a third person may have.

70A-2-313. Express warranties by affirmation, promise, description, sample.
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
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bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the description.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the
goods does not create a warranty.
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ADDENDUM B
PORTIONS OF RECORD ON APPEAL OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO
THE COURT'S DETERMINATION
1.

Transcript Of Hearing On Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment,
dated May 14,1998

2.

1-46

Bond Of Motor Vehicle Dealer, Salesperson, Or Crusher,
dated April 26, 1996

48-51

1

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

-oOo-

4

JAMES GORDON HOLMES,
Plaintiff,

5
6

Case No. 970900877 CV
HEARING ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.

7

AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE,
et al.,

8

Defendants.

(Videotape Proceedings)

9
10

-oOoBE IT REMEMBERED that on the 14th day of May,
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1998, commencing at the hour of 8:16 a.m., the above-
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entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE
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HOMER WILKINSON, sitting as Judge in the above-named

14

Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the

15

following videotape proceedings were had.

16
17

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff:

ANTHONY MARTINEAU
RAY G. MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
3098 Highland Drive, #450
Salt Lake City, Utah
84106

For the Defendants:

PAUL M. BELNAP
Attorney at Law
Strong & Hanni
9 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

18
19
20
21
22
23

A.W. LAURITZEN
Attorney at Law
610 North Main
P.O. Box 171
Logan, Utah
84321

24
25

ALAN P. SMITH, CSR

COPY

385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT:

The matter before the

Court is the case of James Gordon Holmes vs. American
States Insurance and others.
Would you please state your name and who you
represent for the record?
MR. MARTINEAU:

Anthony Ray Martineau

and Ray Martineau for the plaintiff, Mr. Holmes, your
Honor.
MR. BELNAP:

Paul Belnap for American

States.
MR. LAURITZEN:

A.W. Lauritzen for

Economy Auto Wrecking and Clarendon National Insurance
Company.
THE COURT:

I believe this comes

before the Court on both the defendants' motion for
summary judgment.
You may proceed.
MR. MARTINEAU:

Your Honor, I believe

there is also a motion to try (inaudible) indispensable
parties to this property before the Court—
THE COURT:
MR. BELNAP:

Yes.

That's correct.

Your Honor, we were

before the Court a few months ago on some motions on this
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matter and—and we set forth the facts at that time, but
I'd like to briefly review those, if that's all right
with the Court.
THE COURT;

That's fine.

I've read

your memorandums.
MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor, this case

involves a 1994 Hummer vehicle that was involved in an
accident that my client insured for Christiansen
Development, the owner of that vehicle.
In the course of dealings between my client and
its insured, it was determined that my client would pay
its insured the benefits of the policy.

During all of

that time, the vehicle sat at Carlsen Cadillac, the
Hummer dealer where it was towed after the accident.
While it was at Carlsen Cadillac and before my
client paid its insured the benefits of the policy, the
plaintiff in this case, Mr. Holmes, went down to Carlsen
Cadillac and inspected the vehicle there.

He inquired

what was going to happen with the vehicle and Carlsen
Cadillac, someone there told him that it was a vehicle
that he could call American States about.

And so he did

so.
He contacted a representative at my client,
asked what the intentions were with respect to the
vehicle and was told, we're not certain and no further
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communication was had between Mr, Holmes and my client
until after he had purchased the vehicle.
From that point, Intermountain Towing solicited
bids for the vehicle from dealers in the State of Utah,
and Mr. Lauritzen's client, Economy Auto, submitted a bid
and bought the vehicle, paid a check to my client,
although he freely states that there was no transaction
or dealings directly between Economy Auto and American
States, the check was made to my client and they did
receive it.
The vehicle was then towed at the request of
Mr. Fullmer of Economy Auto to a (sic) auto auction
facility, Western Affiliated.
During this time, before the vehicle went on
the auction block, the plaintiff again inquired about
purchasing the vehicle and called Mr. Fullmer directly
and said that he was interested in the vehicle and they
discussed price and Mr. Holmes made an offer of $15,000
to buy the vehicle.
Now, at this point in time, I think it's
important to the issues of this case that we also
understand a little bit about Mr. Holmes.
unsophisticated purchaser.

He's not an

He has approximately 40 or 50

vehicles that he's bought and/or restored that he uses in
a movie set production business that he has among other
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ventures, that he rents out these vehicles and allows

2 i them to be used.
3 I

He's also sophisticated enough that he took

4

photographs of this vehicle and inspected it before he

5

bought it and he's the one that did the repairs to it,

6

Judge.

j

Now, going back to the time that he talks to

8

Mr. Fullmer, he makes an offer of 15,000, Mr. Fullmer

9

says that's not enough.

The vehicle then goes to auction

10

and at the auction, Mr. Holmes is present and inspects

11

the vehicle again, at the auction.

12

J the auction.

13

j Hillcrest Service at the auction.

14

I

He doesn't buy it at

The vehicle's bought by a company called

And at the auction, when they buy that vehicle,
Mr. Holmes then contacts Hillcrest Service and says, I'm

15

interested in purchasing that vehicle and he buys it from

16

them.

17

And we asked him in his deposition, Was it in the

18

same condition as when you inspected it at Carlsen

19

Cadillac?

20

missing—somebody had stolen its owner's manual out of

21

the glovebox; other than that, it was in exactly the same

The answer is, Yes, it was, except it was

22 condition as when he'd originally inspected it and
2 3 I photographed it.
24

I

He received a bill of sale from Hillcrest

25

j Service saying, this vehicle is sold as is, with no

guarantees.
At that point in time, he also received a
document that was a re-assignment of title that had been
signed by Economy Auto to Western Affiliated who in turn
signed it to Hillcrest who in turn signed an assign—a
re-assignment of title to Mr. Holmes.

There's no

question he knew what he wanted, there's no question he
knew what he was buying.
He had even gone to the extent of doing some
research, which is set out in his deposition to find out
what the vehicle was worth and he determined that one of
these vehicles, new, was worth approximately $60,000,
according to him, and so he made a conscious decision of
what it was going to cost to repair and what that vehicle
would be worth to him, knowing that he was buying it as
is, knowing that he was going to do those repairs,
knowing exactly what he was buying.
I asked him in his deposition about this
research that he did, about the $60,000 and then I asked
him, your Honor:
QUESTION:

So, you relied on your own

sense of what this used vehicle, after you fixed
it, may or may not be worth; is that true?
ANSWER:

I think that's a correct

statement.
6

QUESTION:

You knew the vehicle was

being sold in its damaged condition for what
value it had in that condition for salvage; is
that right?
ANSWER:

Yes.

As I knew it, when I

bought it, it was being sold as is, that is
correct•
In this case, Judge, the plaintiff claims
against my client that we are responsible under the
Consumer Sales Practices Act, under the Motor Vehicle Act
and under common law, alleged duties of negligence.

And

I'd like to deal with each and also state at the outset,
that the plaintiff in this case has admitted and it is
not disputed, that American States is not in the business
of buying or selling motor vehicles.
MR. MARTINEAU:
Honor.

Objection, your

Mr. Belnap is asserting facts that aren't in

evidence and he's certainly stating things that are
contrary to the record.
American States buys and sells thousands o f —
THE COURT:

(Inaudible) argue that,

Counsel.
MR. MARTINEAU:

Well, but he's not

talking—
THE COURT:

7

I will—I will allow you

1 it o —

2I
3

MR. MARTINEAU:

I would lodge an

objection to his argument.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. BELNAP:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. BELNAP:

That's fine.
Your Honor, we pointed—
(Inaudible)
— w e pointed this out in

8

our moving papers in this case and I would refer the

g

Court to a letter that Mr. Martineau wrote me August 7th,

10

1997, before this motion was filed, and it says on Page 4

11

of this letter and I quote:
"It is not disputed that American is not in the

12
13

business of buying or selling motor vehicles."

End of

14 I quote.
MR. MARTINEAU:

15
16
17

i taken out of context.

Your Honor, that is

That was in reference to the fact

that we were asking about the number of vehicles they

18

sell through their salvage operation's insurance company.

19

We don't contest the fact that they're an unlicensed

20
21
22

motor vehicle dealer.

thousands of vehicles that they take on salvage
recoveries and on total loss recoveries.
THE COURT:

23
24
25

These guys sell thousands and

You may argue that,

Counsel.
MR. BELNAP:

8

Your Honor, the first

<l

thing that is alleged in this case is that American State

2

has a fiduciary duty to this plaintiff, Mr. Holmes. As

3

we briefed, your Honor, it is fundamental law in Utah

4

that for a fiduciary duty to exist, there must be a

5

fiduciary relationship between the parties.

g

Not only is there no fiduciary relationship in

7

this case, there is no relationship at all, as is

g

undisputed in the facts between American States and this

9

plaintiff.

10
11
12
-I3
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Not only was there not an arm's length

transaction, there was no transaction directly at all
between these parties, and we briefed, we feel that claim
fails, as a matter of law.
Secondly, to allege that we are responsible as
a supplier under the consumer sales practices act, it
indicates that to be in—to be hooked under that act, or
to be—have jurisdiction of that act to you, it applies
I to a person who, quote, "regularly solicits, engages or
enforces consumer transactions11.
It's undisputed that American States does not
meet that statutory definition and the plaintiff has
failed to provide any issue to this Court that would give
it a basis to say that it's other than summary judgment
material, as a matter of law on that claim.
The third basis that the plaintiff claims that
American States is liable is under the Motor Vehicle Acts

in the Utah Code,

And in that act, there is the creation

of a civil violation under the following circumstances,
Judge, and I quote from Section 41-3-702, Sub (3)(c),
41-3-702, Sub (3)(c).
Quote:

"Fraudulently certifying that a damaged

motor vehicle is entitled to an unbrand of title as
defined in 41-la-1001, comma, when it is not.

Period."

Now, in this case, Mr. Holmes, when he went
through his attempts to purchase this vehicle and
ultimately bought it from Hillcrest Service, he
ultimately went to the bank and he ultimately went down
and applied for a title to this vehicle and received what
is called in the vernacular an unbranded title.
He knew what he was buying.

He chose the type

of title that he applied for when this vehicle was
titled; but going to the heart of this claim that is
alleged, that American States fraudulently certified that
a damaged vehicle is entitled to an unbranded title, your
Honor, it's undisputed in this case that there were no
representations—underlying the word "no"—
representations between American States and this
plaintiff.
And I suppose one of the most direct things
that we understand about Utah law, when you read the
various cases that deal with fraud and the nine elements

10

and those other things, is that there has to be some sort
of a misrepresentation, there has to be a reasonable
reliance to detriment and there has to be the intent to
deceive and done with the intent to induce reliance
thereon.
Now, the plaintiff argues that there's been a
reckless misrepresentation.

Your Honor, you don't even

need to get that far, but I want to deal with it anyway,
because there is an absence.

To stand and say there's

any representation, there is an absence of fact that
would support that and this claim is clearly ripe to be
dismissed as a matter of law.
It does not meet the fraud requirements as set
forth by our Supreme Court, there have been no
misrepresentations as between my client and the
plaintiff.

He freely admits he knew what he was buying,

he dealt with several people in the chain other than us
and ultimately purchased from the final person that got
it at the auction.
Finally, it's claimed very briefly in the
complaint that—that we're somehow liable under the UCC.
We believe it is clear under the UCC, your Honor, that
that involves transactions in goods between a buyer and a
seller and there is no relationship of buyer and seller
in this case, as between my client and the plaintiff in

11

this case, and we would therefore ask this Court to grant
our motion for summary judgment,
I would also state, your Honor, and I don/t
know to what extent the Court wants to deal with this,
but after this matter was briefed, the plaintiff
submitted a supplemental memorandum without leave of this
Court, we objected to that.

If you want to deal with

that, I/ll certainly take that up on any questions that
you have, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Well, I've read it and I

saw your objection and I saw all the things that I think
this could have a bearing either way as far as the
decision in this case.
MR. BELNAP:

Thank you.

MR. LAURITZEN:

If it please the

Court, Mr. Belnap has left me very little to tell the
Court, it's all been said except for a couple of things
in the facts.
The Court needs to understand that somehow
Intermountain Tow, which is also an automobile dealer,
got involved in it.

They signed a bill of sale or an

assignment over to Economy Auto.

They did so, I take it,

as an agent for the defendant, American States, because
that seems to be what it says; but nevertheless, they are
a dealer.

12

1

After they assigned it to Economy, Economy re-

2

assigned the title to Western Affiliated,

3

Western Affiliated signed it over to Manheim Utah Auto

4

Auction.

5

assigned the whatever it is, re-assigned the documents

6

over to this group that actually dealt with the

7

plaintiff, James Gordon Holmes, which was Hilltop—

8

Hillcrest Auto?

g

Thereafter,

Manheim Utah Auto Auction assigned the—re-

Hillcrest Auto, I believe.

Other than that, I don't think I can add much

10

to the facts and frankly, I'm not going to belabor the

11

law because it has been presented very appropriately and

12

completely to the Court and it's ready for decision in

13

each one of those areas.
I would only say, if the Court wants me to

14
15

argue the matter of parties, indispensable parties at

16

this point, I would go on to that; other than that, I'll

17

18

J defer until we're through with the argument on this
matter.
THE COURT:

19
20

of these others before we get into that.
MR. LAURITZEN:

21
22
23
24
25

Let's wait, resolve some

Thank you, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. MARTINEAU:

I'd like to direct

the Court's attention to Utah Code Annotated, Section

13

1

41-la-1005.

2

company declares a vehicle a salvaged vehicle and takes

3

possession of the vehicle for disposal or an insurance

4

company pays off the owner of a vehicle that is stolen

5

and not recovered, the insurance company shall within ten

6

days from the settlement of the loss, surrender to the

7

division the outstanding certificate of title properly

8

endorsed or other evidence of ownership acceptable to the

9

12

13
14
15
16

I would also like to direct the Court's
attention to Utah Code Annotated 41-la-105, Subsection
(2) which states, any person, insurance company or dealer
licensed under 41, Chapter 3, Part 2, licensing, who
fails to obtain a salvage certificate as required in this
section or who sells a vehicle without first obtaining a
salvage certificate is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
Your Honor, our client investigated this

17
18
19
20
21

If an insurance

division.

10
11

Subparagraph (l)(a) states:

vehicle.

He made inquiry concerning the status of the

vehicle and he understood he was buying a used motor
vehicle.

It's not uncommon for dealers to sell vehicles

that have been involved and—and have some property

„

I damage to them, you see thousands and thousands of used

23

vehicles sold with a bent fender or a ding in them, but

24

in this instance, your Honor, the defendants7 own

25

evidence is that they paid $49,840.90 for a vehicle that

14

cost/ new, something less than that.
The defendants have produced copies of their
invoices that they paid the loss on this vehicle•

The

defendant turned around and they sold the vehicle for
$12,000.

That's about one-fourth of its fair market

value.
In the documents that American States Insurance
Company has produced and that have been submitted to the
Court as exhibits, we have a document that was received
on August 28th, 1995, identifying this vehicle as a rollover , total loss.
I have another document dated August 11th,
1995, where again the defendant, American States, states
that this vehicle is a total loss.
I have the defendants' repair estimates
reflecting the fact that it's going to cost in excess of
$33,855 to repair this vehicle.
Your Honor, the law is very clear, this is a
problem that the Court has seen us in front of you before
on in other matters and this is such a problem that the
Utah Legislature has taken affirmative action and imposed
legal duties upon insurance companies and upon dealers
that deal in motor vehicles so that the Court doesn't
have to hear these kind of motions, so that the Court
doesn't have to go back in and re-decide every cotton

15

picking case that comes up as to whether a vehicle has
been damaged and is salvage or isn't.
We have also, your Honor, obtained the warranty
service records for the vehicle in question.

The

warranty service vehicle records from Carlsen Cadillac—
MR. BELNAP:
to this, your Honor.

Excuse me.

I'd object

If you want to consider it, we'll

abide by the Court's ruling, but we were before the Court
prior on this motion for summary judgment, counsel for
plaintiff filed a Rule 56(f) motion asking for additional
time to do discovery, when the case had been pending for
over a year.
MR. MARTINEAU:

That's not true, your

Honor.
MR. BELNAP:

This Court—

MR. MARTINEAU:

The case had been

pending for nine months—
THE COURT:

Counsel?

MR. MARTINEAU:

—Mr. Belnap was not

coun—
THE COURT:

Counsel, let him finish.

MR. MARTINEAU:

But I'm not going to

be—
THE COURT:

Counsel, let him finish.

MR. MARTINEAU:

16

Then have him state

<l
2
3
4

the facts—
THE COURT:

Counsel.

You may finish, Mr. Belnap.
MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor, we were

5

before the Court on a 56(f) motion when this case had

g

been filed and pending up to that time.

7

the motion and said it was not well taken and told

g

counsel for the plaintiff to respond to the motions,

g

This Court heard

At that point, your Honor, under my

10 understanding of procedure, Utah procedure, discovery is
^ I closed while this motion is pending and Counsel proceeded
^2

with additional depositions by way of subpoena to Carlsen

-I2 Cadillac for records.
14

We haven't taken the deposition of those

15

people, they're simply documents that have been supplied.

16

I I don't know what the value is of them or not or what the

17

I underlying substance of them is, but I think it's a clear

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

violation of what this Court ordered.
And for them to proceed and now try to
introduce these hearsay documents, if you want to submit
them to yourself for review and consideration in this
case, so be it; but I think it's a violation of the
procedure and the order that was in front of this Court
and I wanted to raise that for that purpose.
Thank you.

17

THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. MARTINEAU:

Your Honor, this case

was filed in Janu—or February of 1997. The motion for
summary judgment was filed in October of 1997, it wasn't
a year old, as Mr. Belnap indicated.

And Mr. Belnap

knows full well that notwithstanding motions for summary
judgment, discovery is still allowed.

And he, in the

Campbell vs. State Farm case, engaged in extensive
discovery after motions for summary judgment were not
only filed, but granted, and the case was on appeal to
the Utah Supreme Court.
There is nothing in the rules that preclude or
prohibit us from putting the facts together necessary to
try our case.
THE COURT:

And I—I, in this matter,

ruled, I did rule as far as 56(f) motions and continuing
the depositions through that, but I did not give an order
stopping all further discovery in the matter.

I would

allow any material as admissible material to argued on
summary judgment.
MR. MARTINEAU:

The purpose for

bringing this to the Court's attention, your Honor, is
that Carlsen Cadillac, who was in possession of the
vehicle from the time it was rolled until it was disposed
of by American and Economy Auto, reflects in the warranty

18

1

history records that this vehicle has a void warranty,

2

vehicle scrapped.

3

This is reflected on numerous invoices that

4

have been submitted to both counsel and we also have an

5

invoice when the vehicle was damaged and rolled, brought

6

in, it shows that there's extensive body damage, vehicle

Y

rolled three times.

8
9

10
11

This was never disclosed to the plaintiff.
This was never made known to the plaintiff.

As far as

the plaintiff, knew, he was buying a used motor vehicle
with some prop—body damage and it wasn't until after he

-12 purchased the vehicle and took it in for some warranty
13

repairs that he was informed by Carlsen Cadillac that

14

this was a salvaged motor vehicle, that the warranty

15

service records reflected that it was scrap, that it

16

didn't exist and it was no longer on the available—or no

17

longer manufacturer's warranty available on it.
THE COURT:

18

Tell me, Counsel, when

19

the car is sold as is, regardless of whether it's

20

scrapped or not, does the warranty apply or is the

21

warranty voided at that point anyway?
MR. MARTINEAU:

22

This vehicle had

23

9,000 on it.

Mr.—the—the warranty would be—there

24

would be no warranty as between our purchaser, the

25

plaintiff, and Hillcrest Auto, or those that—that—

19

•j

because they made n o —

2

THE COURT:

But you're saying there's

3 J a factory warranty?
4

MR. MARTINEAU:

5 I

THE COURT:

6

Pardon me?

But you're saying there's

a factory warranty?
MR. MARTINEAU:

7

There is a factory—

8

there should have been a factory warranty in addition—or

g

and—and—and a dealer may or may not extend other

10

additional warranties, depending upon the particular

11

dealer; but this had less than 10,000 miles on it and

12

-13
14
15
16
17

18
19

I these vehicles come with a 40,000-mile warranty on them.
Your Honor, the point of this case is that this
vehicle was declared as salvage,- the facts demonstrate
that it was a salvage.

The facts also demonstrate that

American States failed to abide by the requirements that
the Motor Vehicle Act imposes upon insurance companies
who salvage out or pay losses on vehicles.
The facts are also very clear that Economy Auto

20

knew full well that it was buying a salvaged motor

21

vehicle and nevertheless failed to take the affirmative

22

steps imposed upon it to obtain the salvage title, as

23

required by law.

24
25

We have litigated cases very similar to this
and in one instance, in front of Judge Dee Benson in

20

-I

Federal Court on a case virtually identical to this,

2

Judge Benson recognized that this is a very similar to

3

the thief who has been caught, out in the parking lot

4

with a bunch of goods and he in turn offers to give the

5

goods back and therefore, not to prosecute him or not to-

6

-to go after him for the other damages that he's caused.

7

Judge Benson recognized that when a dealer

g

doesn't comply with the Motor Vehicle Act and doesn't

g

disclose the salvage, that's just like the—the thief out

10

in the parking lot that's been caught.

11

American's and Economy's belated offers at this

12

point to correct the problem and get him a salvage title,

13

doesn't remedy the problem that has been engendered here

14

15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I by their having committed civil and criminal violations
of the Motor Vehicle Act.
MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor, we certainly

don't admit that there's been criminal violation, but the
bottom line is, for purposes of this case, if you go to
the statute and there's—it's interesting to note that
there was no argument rebutting what I said in my opening
argument about this, that the statute is very clear when
it talks about civil penalties, that the only penalty
that applies is, quote, "Fraudulently certifying that the
vehicle is entitled to an unbranded title."
And there has been no fraudulent certification

21

in this case, there's no representations, there's no
dealings between myself or between American States and
Mr. Holmes, and therefore, as a matter of law, the civil
penalties in this do not apply and to say otherwise,
there's no support for it.
And the other arguments haven't been rebutted,
I~
THE COURT:

Is the plaintiff entitled

to a warranty on that vehicle?
MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor, that's not

an issue that was briefed before the Court and those
documents were subpoenaed from Carlsen Cadillac after
the—the briefing was done in this case, and I don't know
the answer to that, Judge.

I don't know why Carlsen has

listed that on their records, perhaps mistakenly.
I felt that while the summary judgments were
pending and a 56(f) had been denied, that discovery w a s —
was closed and so we didn't proceed with any depositions
of the Carlsen people, nor have the plaintiff.

They

simply obtained those documents, for which we don't have
an explanation as to who or why they were created or—or
what they mean, Judge.
The vehicle was at Carlsen when the plaintiff
himself went down there, checked on it, spoke with
Carlsen.

22

1

THE COURT:

2

original seller of the vehicle?

3

MR. BELNAP:

5

THE COURT:

Well, they're—they're a

dealer, so what, they could go to that dealer to get

6

j

warranty work?
MR. BELNAP:

8

10

Carlsen is a dealer.

The original seller—

4

g

Is Carlsen the seller,

I

THE COURT:
MR. BELNAP:

Yes.
That's correct?
They're—they're—as I

^ I understand it, right next to Carlsen Cadillac is a—is a
12

I Hummer dealership and I don't know the—the ownership

13

relationship between Carlsen and the Hummer; but I—you

14

know, I guess you could assume that there's some control

15

there since Carlsen generated some documents, but I don't

16

know the answer to that, Judge.

17

18

And I don't think that's

germane to the summary judgment that's before the Court,
I think what's germane is clearly, when you

19

look at the statute that applies for the civil penalty,

20

did American States fraudulently certify that the vehicle

21
22
23
24
25

was entitled to an unbranded title and the answer is no.
And we're not—the other provisions that have
been alleged or the other basis that's been alleged in
the complaint don't apply either, and that hasn't been
rebutted in argument.

23

•j

Thank you, Judge.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. LAURITZEN:

The documents

4

provided by the plaintiff indicate that Carlsen sold the

5

vehicle to Richie Smith, it looks to me like.
THE COURT:

6

Who's Smith?

Did Smith

•j I sell it to Christensen or do you know?
g
9

MR. LAURITZEN:

I don't have any

idea, I just have a document here which is dated '94,

10

from Carlsen Cadillac which shows the purchase price of

11

$60,067.

12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Shows Richie Smith as the purchaser, Carlsen as

the seller.

(Inaudible)

All I know is the vehicle was sold by Carlsen,
I the Court inquired about the answer to that.
THE COURT:

Anything further?

MR. LAURITZEN:
THE COURT:

No.

I want to ask Mr.

Martineau a question, and it's raised, but it came to my
mind and also Mr. Lauritzen raised it in his argument,
his written argument, what are your damages in this case?
What do you claim to be able to prove as far as damages?
MR. MARTINEAU:

The difference

between an unsalvaged motor vehicle and a—and a Hummer
motor vehicle that has a salvaged brand new title.
experts and evidence will show that because it's a

24

Our

«l specialty vehicle, the damages are going to be somewhere
2

in the vicinity of 20 percent.

3

vehicle in this—in this—of this type would be worth

4

approximately 20 percent or less than what the non-

5

salvaged vehicle would be worth.
THE COURT:

6

That a salvage motor

So your—that is, you're

7

not—you're not alleging damages for the failure of the

Q

dealer to get the warranty of the vehicle?
MR. MARTINEAU:

g
10

We have sued Economy

| Auto and we believe that that's an issue of special

^ I damages that a jury should consider and decide.
THE COURT:

12

13
14
15

directly.

Answer my question directly.

Are you alleging

damages of the failure to have the warranty from the
dealer to your client?
MR. MARTINEAU:

16
17

Then answer my question

Certainly, your

Honor, that's—that is—that's why this lawsuit

18

initiated.

Our client went in for warranty repairs and

19

was told there's no warranty here.
THE COURT:

20

So, in other words, if

21

you had the—had the warranty, then you wouldn't bring

22

the lawsuit?

23

MR. MARTINEAU:

No.

There's a second

24

basis for this, your Honor, and that is, this vehicle is

25

a salvaged motor vehicle and the defendants, American

25

States and Economy Auto, did not procure the mandatory
salvage certificate of title within ten days, as they
were required to do.

And a salvaged vehicle is worth

significantly less than a non-salvaged vehicle.
So, we have—we have both of those claims
herein and both of those will have damages particular
thereto.
THE COURT:

One other question.

Paul, in your brief, you refer to Section 70—or Section
41-3-702, Subsection 4, where you cite civil penalty for
violation under Subsection 1 is (a) not less than 1,000
or treble the actual damages caused by the person,
whichever is greater; and (b) reasonable attorney's fees
and costs of the action.
Now, this just doesn't make sense to me.
says violation of Subsection 1.

It

Subsection 1 of that

para—of that, is—is a bunch going to the civil
violation of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3.
MR. MARTINEAU:

That's correct, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

This doesn't have

anything to do with your case, does it?
MR. MARTINEAU:
THE COURT:

How does it?

MR. MARTINEAU:

26

It certainly does.

Economy Auto is a

1

licensed and bonded motor vehicle dealer and it's subject

2

to all the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act.

3

look at S u b s e c t i o n 1, L e v e l A , L e v e l 1, L e v e l 2, L e v e l 3,

4

t h o s e r e f e r b a c k t o p r o v i s i o n s of t h e M o t o r V e h i c l e A c t
found i n —

5
g I
j

THE COURT:
do they refer

What do you mean, where

back?

8

MR. MARTINEAU:

9

THE COURT:

T h e y — p a r d o n me?

Where do they refer back?

10

MR. MARTINEAU:

n

THE COURT:

12

MR- MARTINEAU:

Okay.

For e x a m p l e —

(Inaudible)
Then for example, if

I were to show—go on to Subsection (l)(a).
14

I display business

THE COURT:

provisions t h a t — t h a t

25

license.

THE COURT:

W h e r e d o e s it s a y

u n b r a n d e d o r b r a n d e d t i t l e in S u b s e c t i o n (1)?
MR. MARTINEAU:

23
24

— t h e r e are

i m p o s e u p o n a d e a l e r an o b l i g a t i o n

to d i s p l a y h i s b u s i n e s s

21
22

Well—

MR. MARTINEAU:

18

20

license.

4 1 - 1 A , et c e t e r a —

17

19

Failure to

If y o u g o b a c k i n t o t h e M o t o r V e h i c l e A c t u n d e r

15
16

As you

We have a violation

of ( l ) ( a ) ( 5 ) , f a i l u r e t o m a i n t a i n r e c o r d s on b e h a l f of
I Economy

Auto.
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THE COURT:

I don't buy that.

That

doesn't satisfy me, as far as branded and unbranded
title.
In other words, what I'm saying is, is, I
understand what you're citing here and I don't see where
that follows as a penalty for failure to get a—a branded
title.

And I—you—maybe

(inaudible) today and just read

it last—yesterday and went over it a couple of time, and
I couldn't follow it, so that's why I'm asking you and I
don't see where your penalty here, you have a criminal
penalty, but that's—that's not available to your client.
And the civil penalty, this one here, I don't see is
available to your client.
MR. MARTINEAU:
THE COURT:
just asking.

Well—

And I could be wrong, I'm

And of course, that—
MR. MARTINE1AU:

Would it be

appropriate, your Honor, if we briefed this and submitted
it to you in the form of a letter so that we have time to
adequately to go through the statute and address your
concerns?
THE COURT:

Well, it may be, and of

course, that may be somewhat what Mr. Phelps—Mr. Phelps-Mr. Belnap.

I keep wanting to call you—
MR. BELNAP:

28

He and I —

THE COURT:

You both look alike, you

both—
MR. BELNAP:

He and I tease each

other that we're brothers with different names, Judge.
THE COURT:

Right.

Mr. Belnap also indicated questions on this
warranty situation.
Okay, Counsel.
MR. MARTINEAU:

The significant thing

here, your Honor, is that there are criminal penalties
that are imposed upon people who do not comply with the
Motor Vehicle Act.
This is as comparable to somebody running a
stop sign or a stop light,—
THE COURT:

Yeah, well, I don't—

MR. MARTINEAU:

—causing injury or

damages, and whether we get treble damages or actual
damages, we are entitled to damages for having violated
the Motor Vehicle Act.
We are also entitled to damages under Mr.
Fullmer, Economy Auto's bond for motor vehicle dealer,
salesman and crusher, because that bond specifically
provides for a payment of attorneys' fees in those
instances where the dealer fails to comply with the law,
the rules or regulations concerning commerce in motor

29

vehicles.
And so, not directly on point, but I—I do know
of those independent bases upon which our client is
entitled to recover damages herein and his costs and
attorneys' fees, plus the Consumer Sales Practices Act
provides for costs and attorneys' fees and double damages
if this—if it's determined that Economy and American
acted unconscionably and under the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code, one of the—when you deal with
consequential damages arising out of a breach, attorneys'
fees are awarded under the Commercial Code as well.
We have—
THE COURT:

I understand.

MR. MARTINEAU:
THE COURT:

Are there—

You may—are you through?

MR. MARTINEAU:

Are there any

questions I can address to the Court?
THE COURT:

No, that's—that's all,

and I will allow you to have the last say on it.
MR. BELNAP:

Judge, with respect to

further briefing, we'll abide by the Court's directions,
but I would simply point out, your Honor, that there was
extensive briefing at the time we came before you at the
56(f) and motion to compel hearing.

There's been

extensive briefing here with the Court allowing a
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<l

supplemental memorandum and we think it's appropriate to

2

submit this case and there hasn't been a showing that

3

it's not ripe for summary judgment, your Honor.
THE COURT:

4

Well, I'm going to rule

5

this way, Counsel, and in light, of course, of what Mr.

g

Martineau said, maybe the Court was hasty in the Rule 56

7

motion; however, I don't think I was, going to what was

g

being asked at that time.
But I am concerned as far as this issue of

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

warranty.

I'm of this opinion and I'm so ruling, that I

don't believe plaintiff has a cause of action under the—
under the Consumer Practices Act or the Uniform
Commercial Code.

I think this comes under the motor

vehicle section, dealer violation.
I think that I'll—I'll—I'll allow Counsel to
bring further information to me, whether this provision
here, which I questioned him on, does apply to a branded
or unbranded title, the Court, at this point, can't
follow a fact to that.

I'll—this gentleman is not

entitled to any criminal penalties, so don't waste time
arguing criminal penalties to me.
My question here, and I'm also ruling that—
well, I should probably make more findings of fact, too.
That the automobile was, I believe that you argued in
your brief, it sold for 48,000-something, Mr. Martineau?

31

-j supplemental memorandum and we think it's appropriate to
2

submit this case and there hasn't been a showing that

3

it's not ripe for summary judgment, your Honor.

4

THE COURT:

Well, I'm going to rule

5

this way, Counsel, and in light, of course, of what Mr.

6

Martineau said, maybe the Court was hasty in the Rule 56

7

motion; however, I don't think I was, going to what was

8

being asked at that time.
But I am concerned as far as this issue of

9

10

warranty.

11

don't believe plaintiff has a cause of action under the—

12

under the Consumer Practices Act or the Uniform

13

Commercial Code.

14

vehicle section, dealer violation.

15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I'm of this opinion and I'm so ruling, that I

I think this comes under the motor

I think that I'll—I'll—I'll allow Counsel to
bring further information to me, whether this provision
here, which I questioned him on, does apply to a branded
or unbranded title, the Court, at this point, can't
follow a fact to that.

I'll—this gentleman is not

entitled to any criminal penalties, so don't waste time
arguing criminal penalties to me.
My question here, and I'm also ruling that—
well, I should probably make more findings of fact, too.
That the automobile was, I believe that you argued in
your brief, it sold for 48,000-something, Mr. Martineau?
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MR. MARTINEAU:

That's what the

insurance company paid for the loss, your Honor,
THE COURT:

Did you want to argue

that it was more than what it was bought—paid—bought
for?
MR. MARTINEAU:

That's correct, your

Honor, I've got an exhibit attached, if I could approach
the bench and show you what—
THE COURT:

No, I'm just—I'm just

making these findings.
That the vehicle, as argued by Mr. Martineau,
sold for 48,600-something, that the insurance company
paid 48—9—forty-nine eight for it, get those exact
figures; that, and again, you'll have to help me, that
the plaintiff offered to pay American—was it 10,000?
MR. LAURITZEN:
THE COURT:

Twelve—

Twelve thousand?

MR. LAURITZEN:

Well, the plaintiff

was ten—
THE COURT:

Was twelve and that he

finally—he offered Economy before the auction—
MR. LAURITZEN:
THE COURT:

Fifteen.

—fifteen, and then he

eventually bought it for—
MR. MARTINEAU:
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Twenty-five thousand-

-twenty-three five,
THE COURT:

That the plaintiff saw

the vehicle while in the possession of Carlsen and/or
American, he saw the vehicle in the possession of
Economy, he saw the vehicle at the auto auction, h e —
then, of course, I guess, purchased from Hillcrest and
saw it again•
That the Court would find that the plaintiff
had knowledge and knew the condition of the vehicle, that
he was a sophisticated buyer, he had dealt in these
matters before and had every opportunity to know
concerning the—the condition of the vehicle.
That the plaintiff was not at any time misled
or misrepresented to, there was no fraud, he never relied
on anything as far as statements, or on the branded or
unbranded title; that there was not a fiduciary
relationship in any way between the plaintiff and the
defendants.
At first blush, this may be the case, it
appears that the plaintiff may have buyer's remorse in
this matter, that he was not a bona fide purchaser, all—
entitled to the protection of the provisions requiring
the insurance companies and/or automobile dealers to
obtain a branded title.
And the Court would grant the defendants'
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-I motions as far as any cause of action under the Consumer
2

Sales Practices Act or the—or the UCC or the—or any

3

type of fraudulent act.

4

MR. LAURITZEN:

41-3-702 (3), Sub C, your Honor, fraudulent certifying?

5

THE COURT:

6
7

I

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18

Yes.

MR. LAURITZEN:
THE COURT:

8
9

So that would be 7 0 —

Okay.

That the Court is

concerned and the Court does not rule on this, that the
plaintiff, in obtaining an unbranded title, the question
whether he's entitled to the warranty done on that vehi—
on—on—warranty placed on that vehicle, is entitled to
benefits off that warranty, and the Court will not rule
on that matter at this time, leave that matter open as
far as cause of action is concerned.
And of course, that's what I questioned Mr.
Martineau on and that's what I don't know, whether that
warranty still extends or not.
MR. LAURITZEN:

19

Your Honor, in terms

20

of the warranty, obviously my client has no control over

21

a dealer or manufacturer and I'm wondering, just laying

22

this out, should they sue them if we're—
THE COURT:

23
24
25

Well, not—I was going to

go on and say—
MR. LAURITZEN:

34

Okay.

Excuse me.

THE COURT:

—something else, but I

think this leads to the issue raised by Mr. Lauritzen, as
far as joining of other parties in this lawsuit.

I don't

believe he mentions Carlsen Cadillac, maybe Carlsen
Cadillac needs to be brought in as far as the warranty
situation is concerned.
Now, I'm not prepared at this time to dismiss
out completely American States, Economy and Clarendon
National Insurance Company because of the fact that
whether their failure still under the Act to obtain that
branded title led the plaintiff to getting an unbranded
title, misled him to believe that he still had the right
to receive warranty work.

Even though he saw the vehicle

and knew the condition, there may be a question whether
he believed it was scrapped or not scrapped.
And therefore, what I'm saying, I guess, is it
boils down to, the only thing that I leave in this case
is the question of whether the plaintiff's entitled to
warranty work on that automobile.
Any questions?
Now, except as to your motion and I'm not
ruling on your motion.
MR. MARTINEAU:

Right.

what I was going to address very briefly.

And that's
Of course, I

suppose all of the parties that were in the chain that—
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that were qualified, might have neglected to do that and
it might ultimately become a cause of action which they
could recover on as the Court's just said.
Also, perhaps in that case, we should join—we
should think about joining Carlsen and I would amend our
motion to that point and press it upon the Court, based
on my brief and on what the Court has said.
MR. BELNAP:

But your Honor, we

don't—I guess subject to this additional research that
you've asked Mr. Martineau to look at on Subsection 1, we
may not even need to get to that point.
Am I missing something there?
THE COURT:
right.

Well, no.

I think you're

You may not get to it, but you may also, I don't

know.
MR. BELNAP:
THE COURT:

Okay.
I—I don't know what the

liability's going to be for these parties.
MR. BELNAP:

If—if in other words,

if somehow Mr. Martineau can convince the Court that a
dealer's warranty or the failure to get a dealer's
warranty somehow fits under Subsection l of 41-3-702,
then we may be revisiting this at another hearing?
THE COURT:

That's right.

And I

would be inclined, subject to—I don't know what Mr.

36

1

Martineau's going to be—say, but would be inclined to

2

grant the motion to join the additional parties and also

3

Carlsen Cadillac.

4

Martineau.

I don't know where you are, Mr.

MR. MARTINEAU:
6

I understood the

I Court's ruling to be a little broader than what Mr.

•j

Belnap reflected, I understood that we were able to

g

pursue the claims for American's failure to obtain a

9

branded title.
THE COURT:

10

If—if that led to t h e ~

11

to the—the failure to his receiving a warranty on that

12

vehicle.

13

MR. MARTINEAU:

14

joining Carlsen, is—is really kind of a red herring.

15

Okay.

The issue of
We

I are unhappy with, and our client is unhappy with the fact

1g | that there was no manufacturer's warranty on this,
17

I Carlsen didn't extend any warranty.
THE COURT:

18

MR. MARTINEAU:

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Oh.
Which is the American

General dealership itself, it was the American General
dealer—the American General warranty that—that was
void.
THE COURT:

Well, whoever—

MR. MARTINEAU:

And—and that was

void because Economy Auto and American took a salvaged
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motor vehicle—
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. MARTINEAU:

—salvage and it was

never disclosed.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. MARTINEAU:
THE COURT:

And s o —

Maybe there needs to be

some third party, some cross-claims or so forth on it, I
don't know.

And Carlsen may not be a proper party then,

maybe it is this—who did you say, American o r —
MR. MARTINEAU:

American General is

the manufacturer and it's the manufacturer's warranty
that was not on it.
MR. BELNAP:

So in other words, the

Hummer is manufactured—
MR. MARTINEAU:
THE COURT:

Your Honor, I —

Yeah, let him—let him

finish, Mr. Belnap.
MR. BELNAP:

But I just need to

clarify, the Hummer's manufactured by—
MR. MARTINEAU:

Your Honor, I was

not—
MR. BELNAP:

—American General—

MR. MARTINEAU:
MR. BELNAP:
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— I was not—

— i s that right?

1

MR. MARTINEAU:

2

I didn't interfere

like that with Mr. Belnap.

3

THE COURT:

Yeah, Counsel, let him

4 i finish.
5

I

MR. BELNAP:

Well, I'm asking,

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. BELNAP:

Q I

MR. MARTINEAU:

g

Counsel.

No.

Yeah.
Your Honor, American

General had no dealing with American States to term it as

10

a salvage in salvaging this motor vehicle.

11

American General had no bearing on

12
13
14

15
16
17

just—

American—

American—American

States' failure to comply with the statute to get t h e —
t h e — t h e branded title.

American General had no bearing,

I had n o — n o way to know that Economy Auto wasn't going to
fulfill the statutory duty and wasn't going to get a
branded title.
And there was no one in the chain of title

18

after Economy Auto that had any duty or obligation

19

because the statute only posed the duty and obligation on

20

American States and upon Economy Auto.

21

it upon anybody else.

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

MR. MARTINEAU:

It doesn't impose

But d o e s —

These are not the

24

parties necessary to c o n f l i c t — t o unnecessarily

25

and confuse the litigation, to join ten other parties is
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compound

1

just not necessary,
THE COURT:

2

Well, Mr- Laur—now, it

3

appears to me what you're saying, as I look at this case

4

and I don't tell you how to run your case, you know more

5

about it than I do, if this gentleman has a cause of

g

action against the manufacturer, American so-and-so, and

7

maybe they—maybe they have a cause of action then

g

against American and Economy and—and the other two for

9

failure to declare that title a branded title.
MR. BELNAP:

10

That's what my question

11

was, Judge, 'cause I — I haven't researched who all the

12

manufacturers was.

13

the manufacturer and if they're the people that somehow

14

made a decision which we don't know if there is or isn't
a warranty, if that's the claim that the Court—which the

15

Court is focusing on now, then they—they've got to be

16
17

I was just asking, American General's

I the people in the case or we've got to have some research
and a threshold question that would even get to that

18

point under 41-3-702(1) and that's what I understand the

19

Court's ruling to be.

20

THE COURT:

21

That's correct.

22 I

MR. BELNAP:

23 ,

MR. MARTINEAU:

24

I that, your Honor?

25

i

THE COURT:

40

Okay
May I be heard on

Sure.

MR. MARTINEAU:

The manufacturer had

the usual manufacturer's warranty that goes with vehicles
that they sell.

Whether or not that warranty is valid,

depends on what American States and/or Economy Auto did,
there's no reason for American General to be brought in.
Either the warranty's good or it isn't, depending on what
they did.
THE COURT:

Well, and you may be

right, that's what I said.
MR. MARTINEAU:

That's why we don't

need them i n —
THE COURT:

Well—

MR. MARTINEAU:

—because we need

first to see what their breach was, what the American and
Economy's duty was, whether they breached it and whether
that breach has an effect on whether the warranty's in
effect or not.
THE COURT:

Well, and I'm not going

to tell you, either one of you, what to do in this case.
I'm stating that you have the right to bring in
American—
MR. MARTINEAU:
THE COURT:

General.

—General, or Carlsen

Cadillac or anybody, because I've granted your motion to
bring in indispensable parties.
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I'm not saying they are,

1

I said that it appears to me that the gentleman—the

2

plaintiff's damages, if any, are under the warranty, for

3

failure to have a warranty.

4

going to honor that warranty, then he has a cause of

5

action a g a i n s t them a n d t h e y h a v e — m a y b e h a v e a c a u s e of

g

action a g a i n s t t h e p e o p l e w h o d i d n o t g e t t h e — t h e

7

branded t i t l e .

g I
9

10

If the manufacturer isn't

Whether you think you can go, skip over them
and go right to them, that's up to you; of course, they
may want to bring them in, I don't know.
MR. MARTINEAU:

11

Yeah.

We have no

12

problem, present day, we think we have the right parties

13

here, throughout—
THE COURT:

14

15
16

to them the right to bring in the parties that they wish
to and I'll—and you, too, for that matter.
MR. LAURITZEN:

17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Well, and I would grant

But we still, your

Honor, to clarify, we still have to take a two-step
approach.

There has to be a showing, as you've ruled,

under 41-3-702 (1) that this warranty issue was intended
to be covered under this Level 1, 2, 3 issue, that—so
that we get to that as a matter of law before we go out
and start suing other companies that made a decision on
whether there is or isn't a warranty.
THE COURT:
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I don't know.

I don't—I

don't think it—off the top of my head, I don't agree
with that.

I think they have a cause of action with the

warranty regardless of the statute, but I don't know
that.
MR. LAURITZEN:

Okay.

Then the

question—I'm—I'm asking for clarification whether
there's going to be any additional briefing then before
we start to go out and—and go after people that have
made decisions on this warranty, because that's what I
thought—
THE COURT:
additional briefing.

I don't think we need any

The only thing I'm saying is

warranty, which I question, and which he wants to brief,
which he had—where his damages were and what his cause
of action was.

If he claims he has a cause of action

under the warranty for damages, he can proceed, he
doesn't need to brief it.
MR. LAURITZEN:

I understand the

Court's ruling then that it's related to whether there is
a cause of action for the warranty.
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. LAURITZEN:

Okay.

Who gets to

prepare the order, your Honor?
MR. BELNAP:
I'll prepare it, if you'd like.
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I'll—well, excuse me,

1

THE COURT:

2

feel comfortable with that?

3

order, Mr. Belnap.

You

You prepare the

Where do we go to get

a copy of the transcript of this hearing (inaudible) your

5
6

i Honor.

7

I

o

10

Okay.

MR. MARTINEAU:

4

g

That's fine with me.

THE COURT:

Here, I guess it's all on

tape.
I

MR. BELNAP:

We will need the Court's

I ruling.

.... I

(Inaudible)
THE COURT:

12
13

i more about it than I do.

14

I

Yeah, talk t o ~ h e knows

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

15
* * *

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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The Surety herein reserves the right to withdraw as such surety except as to any Natality already incurred or accrued hereunder and
may do so upon the giving of written notice of such withdrawal to the Principal and to the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division,
provided, however, thai no withdrawal shaft be effective for any purpose until sixty days snail have elapsed from and after the raoeipt
of such notice by the said Administrator, and further provided that no withdrawal shall In anywise affect the iiabilrty of said Surety
arising out of fraud or fraudulent representations or for any violation or violations of said laws or rules by the Principal hereunder prkx
to t * expiration of such period of sixty days, regardless of whether or not the loss suffered has been reduced to juckjement before
to tape* of sixty days.
flgntdand 8ee#ed thai

26

day of

1906

J£L

fAf

^ ^ ^
(pieasepnra)

Prindpai Signature
Market Insurance Company

306ERTT K1NGSLEY Attorney-in-fact
Approved aa to Form
Ofaoa of the Utah Attorney General
MVEO-1 (Rev 4-02)
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t \ and who eaeoued fet lotfloftng tnefrument, and acknowledged to me fSTht

NoUryPvtrtc

TOEBS^
in lheyeeru
, before me pemonaty appea/ed.
tend torn* to ff» to be t * fern of.
ff«, and wtay»»ecuaad *\e tame aa and lof the act and deed of said firm

Notary Pubac
COHPOHATI ACKNOWLKOOIMEHT Of PfaWOPAL
(TO BE COMPUTED BY CORPORATE WTTM CORPORATE 6EAU
S8
r^vc: ^ClaY ot,
, In the year _
,bijng duly ewom, did depoee end say- That he reekJee m
* » • • < & * . .» .'

, before me peftonaty appearedm

, (he oo/poffttkx) dttorfjed
of t h e .
eSe above inatnjmenc that he knew the seal of sett corporation, and Chat he signed hfi r*me thereto by * • oroef.

Notary Public
CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRINCIPAL
(To be executed by corporation withoi*: corporate seal)

Porta ^
davof
to meknovrrv

Pf/uZ
, In the year _
__, before me petsonaly appeared
, dkj depose and say That he reside* tn
of the TZc&A/ianxy 1 /
AustinSXAC <—
the corporation which
Ai
>taalnjmentand which la described therein, that he signed the above mentioned
crooned I instiument on behart or takJ corporation, that ha
*J^ ^- * ~ ^ _
^ ^ M^^s
^ incorporator, of the aakj cc^po^B^enrand by ordef of the Board
e as rt thus appears in the above inetjvnient it

&

Notary Pubic

Af ROAVTT Of QUAURCATIOW

being first dury ewom, on oath
_of said company and that he to duly authorized to
and a*y* thai he is toe.
ewouai and deliver the foregoing obfigabona, that said company is authorized to execute the same and haa compUed In aH reapecta wtth the laws of
Uteh^hlfe*anc* to beoc<nt^scrfe surety
undertakings and ob^tgatione

8utexirt>edanJiwom to before me
1b
S^tfrantoiw expires:
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MttfoodUU

STATE OP CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
On this

26th

)
)ss.
)
day of

A

Pril

, 19 96

before me Njpfc flpklason, a Notary Public in and for the State o£
California, personally appeared

Robert T, Kings lev

personally known to me (or proved to me on the basis of
satisfactory evidence) to be the person (s) whose name(s) is/are
subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that
he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their authorized
capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the
instrument is the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which
the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.

WITNESS my hand and official seal. .

Signature

HJiUL

» » 4 i

> I t i«

MCKN90A30N
^%**d&A
COUM.#Wl7I94
1 ?> j J S K J Notoy Pubic - Coitamki
\ " ^ J H v UCflAMeffO COUNTY
J ^^SVlyVComm exowtOCTU 1997
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EQflf^
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRT

* ATTORNEY
HTS.

NO.: 95054257. i

That Market Insurance Company v corporation"), a corporation organized and existing
under the lews o* the State of Illinois, with its main office at Shand Morahan Plaza in the
City of Evanston, Illinois, does hereby nominate, constitute and appoint, for the purpose
stated herein, Financial Pacific Insurance Agency, Sacramento, California* acting through
its staff, Robert C. QoodeU and Robert T. Wngsiey, its true and lawfU attorney-in-fact, with
full power and authority to make, execute and deliver, for and on its behalf as surety, and
as its act and deed, in Illinois and States where the Corporation is qualified to act as an
admitted insurer, aU bonds, recognizances, undertakings, contracts of suretyship or other
written obligations required pursuant to the license and permit bond program administered
for it by Fnanctel Pacific Insurance Agency with a limit of liability not to exceed $50,000
per writing; and the execution of such bonds in pursuance of these presents shall be as
binding upon said Markel Insurance Company to all intents and purposes as if duly
executed by its Chairman, Vice Chairman, President, Senior Vice President and Chief
Administrative Officer, sealed with its corporate seal, and attested by its Secretary or
Assistant Secretary.
This Power of Attorney shall only be valid as evidenced In original form; no copy, certified
or otherwise, shall have any validity or effect- This Power of Attorney is made and
executed by authority of a resolution adopted by the Board of Directors, of which the
following is a true and exact copy.
-RESOLVED:
That, pursuant to Section 8.8 of the Corporation's Bylaws, the Chairman,
Vtoe Chairman, President, Senior Vice President, or Chief Administrative
Officer, with the Secretary or Assistant Secretary, is hereby authorized to
appoint Financial Pacific Insurance Agency, Sacramento, California,
acting through its surety staff, Robert C. Goodell and Robert T. Wngsiey,
as the Corporation's attorney-in-fact with authority to make and execute
j on behalf of the Corporation, in Illinois and States where the Corporation
Is qualified to act as an admitted insurer, bonds, recognizances,
undertakings, contracts of suretyship or other written obligations required
pursuant to the license and permit bonds program administered for it by
Financial Pacific Insurance Agency with a limit of liability not to exceed
$50,000 per writing; also to execute such instruments as may be
necessary or proper in connection with the settlement of claims or the
recovery of reinsurance or salvage.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Markel Insurance Company has caused these presents to be
signed by rts duly authorized ofTicers and its Corporate Seal to be hereunto affixed this
26th

day Of

April

, 19_96

MARKEL INSURANCE COMPANY,
(Seal)

Secretary/Assistant Secre^^ry
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FILED
SEP.

9-J999

JAMES GORDON HOLMES,
Case No. 990168
Plaintiff/Appellant,
ARGUMENT
PRIORITY 15

vs.
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Corporation, ECONOMY
AUTO INC., a Corporation, and
CLARENDON NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Corporation,
Defendants/Appellees.

COPIES OF ORDERS APPEALED FROM

1.

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(F) MOTION AND
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL, DATED March 16,1998

2.

ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DATED JUNE
10, 1998, and

3.

ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DATED JANUARY 22,
1998.

DATED this

9 day of September, 1999.

/%*£r/*t.

>-^y

s&

*^7st^

&T.-C- £*.

Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Copies Of Orders Appealed
From was served upon the following individuals, by mailing a copy thereof,
postage prepaid, at the addresses shown below this /
Paul M. Belnap
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
A. W. Lauritizen
610 North Main
Logan, UT 84321

~Z

day of September, 1999.

Paul M. Belnap, #0279
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
American States Insurance Company
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES GORDON HOLMES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation;
ECONOMY AUTO INC., a
corporation; and CLARENDON
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S
RULE 56(f) MOTION AND
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
COMPEL DISCOVERY

Civil No. 970900877CV

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 20th day of February, 1998,
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge, with plaintiff represented by his
counsel of record and the defendants represented by their counsel of record. The matter was
scheduled for all pending motions including the following:
1. Defendant American States' Motion for Summary Judgment.

2. Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance of Summary Judgment of American
States.
3. Plaintiffs Second Motion to Compel Discovery.
The court reviewed the pleadings submitted in support of and in opposition to the
pending matters and deferred hearing and ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment of
defendant American States granting the plaintiff additional time to respond to said motion and
that of the defendant Economy Auto, as set forth in this order. Based upon the pleadings
submitted to the court and argument of counsel and the court having ruled on these matters in
open court, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs Rule 56(f)
Motion is not well taken and the same is denied. However, the court grants to the plaintiff up to
and including March 9, 1998 to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant
American States and to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Economy Auto.
The plaintiffs Motion to Compel argued and briefed before the court is not well
taken and the same is denied.
DATED this

day of February, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

Homer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of February, 1998, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Order Regarding Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel
was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Ray G Martineau
Anthony R Martineau
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
A W Lauritzen
Attorney for Defendant, Economy Auto
610 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321

1164 998
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Paul M. Belnap, #0279
STRONG &HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
American States Insurance Company
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

JUN 10 E98

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES GORDON HOLMES,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.

AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation;
ECONOMY AUTO INC., a
corporation; and CLARENDON
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,

Civil No. 970900877CV
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 14* day of May, 1998, at the
hour of 8:00 a.m. before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge, with the
parties appearing by and through their counsel of record. The matters considered by the court
were the motion for summary judgement of the defendant American States Insurance, and the

motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative motion to join indispensable parties of
Economy Auto, Inc.
The court, having reviewed the motions and memoranda in support of and in
opposition to the same, and having heard the arguments of counsel and for good cause appearing,
determined that all of the plaintiffs claims against the defendants should be dismissed and
summary judgment granted, dismissing all claims of the plaintiff against the defendants other than
such claims, if any, that might arise if plaintiff can establish a triable issue that the nature and type
of title received by plaintiff (to the vehicle in question) led to an alleged failure of the plaintiff to
receive a factory warranty on the subject vehicle.
The basis for the court's decision and conclusions is as follows:
1. The plaintiff does not have a cause of action under the Uniform Commercial Code
since the defendants were not sellers to the plaintiff.
2. The provisions of Utah Code Ann. §13-11-1 et seq., "Utah Consumer Sales
Practices Act" does not apply to the defendant American States as it is not a "supplier" as
contemplated under the act (U.C.A §13-11-3(6)).
3. The vehicle in question originally was purchased by the insured of defendant
American States for $45,297.
4. After the vehicle was involved in an accident, American States paid its insured,
pursuant to the policy of insurance, the sum of $48,670.
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5. After the vehicle was involved in an accident, it was towed to the "Hummer"
dealership at Carlson Cadillac and was seen by the plaintiff at said dealership where plaintiff
inquired as to the purchase of the same.
6. The vehicle was purchased, through a bid process through Intermountain Tow, by
the defendant Economy Auto for $12,000 and a check was written in said amount from defendant
Economy Auto to American States.
7. The plaintiff offered to purchase the vehicle from Economy Auto for $15,000 but
Economy Auto determined to consign the vehicle to an auction (Utah Auto Auction) through the
auspices of Western Affiliated Auction, a licensed Utah automotive dealer.
8. The vehicle was sold at auction and the plaintiff attended the auction.
9. At the auction, the vehicle was purchased by a company known as Hillcrest
Service for $18,000. The plaintiff in turn purchased the subject vehicle from Hillcrest Service for
$23,500 and received an executed bill of sale, indicating in part "Used vehicles are sold as
accepted and are not guaranteed."
10. Plaintiff saw, photographed and inspected the vehicle while it was at Carlson
Cadillac before the same was purchased by Economy Auto. He saw the vehicle while at the Utah
Auto Auction before the same was sold. Plaintiff communicated with and purchased the same
through Hillcrest Service.

-3-

11. The condition of the vehicle did not change from the time the vehicle was seen at
Carlson Cadillac until after the time the plaintiff purchased the same.
12. The plaintiff had knowledge of this vehicle and general knowledge concerning
vehicles and vehicle repair and was sophisticated in vehicle repair to the extent that he
accomplished the majority of the repairs on the vehicle in question and had every opportunity to
know the condition of the vehicle when he purchased the same.
13. The court determines that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action under the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §41-3-701, giving rise to potential misdemeanor criminal sanctions.
14. Under the civil penalty provisions of Utah Code Ann. §41-3-702, the court does
not believe that the provisions of subparagraph (1) apply to the facts and circumstances and
allegations in this case. With respect to subsection (3)(c) which provides that:
Fraudulently certifying that a damaged motor vehicle
is entitled to an unbranded title, as defined in §411A-1001, when it is not"
The court determines that as a matter of law, the plaintiff was not misled or misrepresented to,
nor did the defendants commit an act of "fraudulently certifying" as contemplated under §(3)(c)
and therefore the court finds that there has been no civil violation and penalty under the
aforementioned statute.
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15. As a matter of law, the court concludes that there was no fiduciary relationship
between the plaintiff and defendants and thus no cause of action could accrue under allegations of
an alleged fiduciary relationship.
16. The court concludes that the only issue remaining in the case is whether the
alleged failure to supply a branded title and/or whether the vehicle qualifies and/or is required to
have a branded title and that if so, whether such failure led to an alleged failure of the plaintiff to
receive a manufacturer's warranty. To determine this issue, the defendants are granted leave to
name as additional parties in this action the manufacturer, American General, the dealer, Carlson
Cadillac, or such other entities as may be necessary and/or appropriate parties to determine the
issue of whether the acts of the defendants have caused the plaintiff to allegedly not receive a
manufacturer's warranty on the vehicle.
Based upon the foregoing, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the defendants are
granted partial summary judgment dismissing the claims of the plaintiff arising under the Uniform
Commercial Code, Utah's Consumer Sales Practices Act, and under Utah Code Ann. §41-3702(3)(c). The only claim against the defendants remaining is to the extent that there is a triable
issue as between plaintiff and defendants whether defendants caused the plaintiff not to receive a
manufacturer's vehicle warranty on the subject vehicle and what damages, if any, result from the
same should there be a triable issue as to the vehicle's manufacturer's warranty.

-5-

Defendants are given leave to add as additional parties-defendant the vehicle
manufacturer, American General, Carlson Cadillac, and such other individuals and/or entities as
may be necessary to a determination of the issues pertaining to the manufacturer's vehicle
warranty.
DATED this /&

day of-May: 1998.
Y THE COURT.

T^^se^e
er F. Wilkinson
istrict Court Judge

-6-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this AO

day of May, 1998, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Order of Partial Summary Judgment was served on the following:
Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

(By Hand Delivery)

A. W. Lauritzen
(By U.S.Mail)
Attorney for Defendant, Economy Auto
610 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321

JJJ.AX.
1164.998
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Paul M. Belnap, #0279
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
American States Insurance Company
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES GORDON HOLMES,

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation;
ECONOMY AUTO INC., a
corporation; and CLARENDON
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 970900877CV

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

)

The above entitled matter came on for hearing on December 29, 1998 before the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson with the parties appearing through their counsel of record. The
matters before the court were Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant American
States Insurance Company's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Christopher Haderlie and Plaintiffs

Motion to Reconsider the Order of Partial Summary Judgment dated June 10, 1998.
The issues having been briefed by the parties as well as argued orally and the Court
having considered the written memoranda and the oral arguments and being fully advised in the
premises, the Court determined that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be
granted, American States Insurance Company's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Christopher
Haderlie should be denied and Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider should be denied.
1. With respect to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, the court reconsidered the
pleadings and arguments made by counsel and affirms its prior order of June 10, 1998 believing
that such ruling was correct.
2. With respect to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, even if
representations were made by individuals or entities other than these defendants that the
manufacturer's warranty on plaintiffs vehicle was void, plaintiff has no cause of action against
these defendants pertaining to the manufacturer's warranty on plaintiffs vehicle.
4. With respect to American States Insurance Company's Motion to Strike the
Affidavit of Christopher Haderlie, the court feels that there is no cause of action against these
defendants whether there was or was not a factory warranty on the vehicle, but the court has
considered the affidavit and feels that such testimony could be admissible, but not relevant to a
cause of action against these defendants and therefore denies the motion to strike.
Based upon the foregoing, it is
-2-

HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider is denied. The court affirms its ruling of June
10, 1998.
2. American States Insurance Company's Motion to Strike is denied.
3. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the complaint of the
plaintiff against the defendants is hereby dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendant.
DATED this

day of Decemberr4#9«^
BY THE COURT:

I

°A
Homer F. Wilkinson
District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martjaeau
Attorneys for Plafinjiff

A. WTLauritzen^
Attorney for Defendant, Economy Auto
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